THE IRISH MANOEUVRES, 1899. 
d 6 5 
guard he could have marched the whole of his concentrated force away 
from his opponent’s divided forces with the certainty of reaching his 
objective. 
The Director’s Comments were as follows : — 
“ The Blue Commander’s orders were clear and concise, and the 
position which he had decided to ocupy near Ballygeehin was strate¬ 
gically correct It was the right line for him to adopt with a view to 
affecting a, junction with his main Army when he found the principal 
road through Abbeyleix blocked. He took a sound strategical view 
of the situation, and gave himself the best chance of carrying out his 
orders and joining the Blue Army. He showed considerable skill in 
the execution of his flank march, and in the selection of his position 
which he occupied. From this position the Blue Commander could 
not have been turned out by the force at the disposal of the Red Com¬ 
mander before the latter had recalled his detached troops from Ballina- 
kill. 
" The Director is of opinion that the Red Commander hardly 
appreciated that Blue’s left was his strategic flank, and that his en¬ 
deavours should be to get to “ windward ’’ so to speak, of that flank. 
Either the Blue Cavalry was extremely active in preventing the dis¬ 
covery of the main body’s position, or there was want of enterprise and 
method in the scouting of the Red Cavalry, but the fact remains that 
the Red Commander was ill served by his Cavalry Brigade, and it was 
not until informed by the Director that his left flank was secure, that 
he made any advance westwards.” 
The strategical situation developed in the operations described 
above suggests much food for thought. Although the Blue Com¬ 
mander succeeded in his endeavour its hazardous nature is indisput¬ 
able. Had the Red Commander been correctly informed of his 
opponent’s whereabouts, and the whole of the Red Force concentrated 
at Abbeyleix, he could have fallen: on the Blue Force before it had 
completed its development, (as Radetzky fell on the Sardinians at 
Mortara, and as the Germans fell on Bazaine’s Army at Vionville*) 
catching it flagrante delicto , attacking it with superior force, and driv¬ 
ing it away from its line of communication. 
Many lessons were taught by these three day’s manoeuvres—chief 
among them being the necessity for pushing home the cavalry recon¬ 
naissance. Correct information is essential for a commander before 
forming his plans. Surmise cannot be relied upon as a basis for action. 
The wish is oftentimes father to the thought. Napoleon made three 
surmises on the eve of the battle of Jena, and they were all wrong.f 
The Red Commander’s surmise that the Blue attack would be made on 
his left flank led him to make false tactical combinations, and at the 
*And as Wellington did on Marmont at Salamanca though in this, case owing to the English 
Commander not following up his victory with a pursuit the French regained their base at Valladolid. 
t Campaign of Jena, October, 1806. On the 10th he thought .Prince Hohenlohe was about to 
attack him; on the same date he erroneously believed the Prussians were concentrating at Gera, 
and on the 13th he thought he was opposed by the whole Prussian Army instead of by only the 
portion under Hohenlohe. The result of this last surmise was that he massed at Jena a force 
double that of his enemy, while he left Davout with only 2.7,000 men to fight the Duke of Brunswick 
with 51,000. Davout was victorious but this was not owing to Napoleon’s superior strategy. 
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