THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1897-8. 
235 
already detailed by tbe middle of October. The main body was to 
strike from the Kohat-Kurram road, assembling at Shinawari, and 
cross the pass tranversely, in the direction of the Khanki, Mastura 
and Barah watersheds, so as to arrive directly on to the head waters of the 
valley forming the Orakzai and Afridi Tirah, a far preferable plan to 
working up the valleys from their openings on our own frontiers, and 
conferring considerable strategic advantages. The Bara column act¬ 
ed as a containing force at the opening of that valley, the Kurram 
moveable column doing the same in that direction. It is not necessary 
or possible in the space to relate or discuss the campaigns further 
than to illustrate the doings of the various batteries, or to refer or 
combat such criticisms as the campaigns have evoked, suffice it to say 
the advance to Bagh via Shinawari entailed the forcing of three very 
high passes, the Chagru Kotal, the Sampagha and the Arhanga. 
Before the actual advance began, engagements occured in reconnoitring 
and while improving the approaches to the pass. At the storming of 
Dargai,* which took place on 20th October, 1897, and at the forcing of 
the Chagru Kotal, four Mountain Batteries were in action No. 8 aud 9, 
R.A., and No. 1 KohatandNo. 5 Bombay, Mountain Batteries, Colonel 
Purdy commanding. Three of these batteries were massed, one de¬ 
tached. The enemy’s losses here were almost entirely due to artillery 
fire, they being so posted that rifle fire could not touch them, and the 
attacking infantry being shot down without being able to make 
effective reply. 
The next engagement of artillery of any importance was on the 
29th October, at the forcing of the Sampagha, where the batteries 
worked to a great extent by brigade divisions, the G.O.C., R.A., 
Brigadier-General Spragge controlling the 6 batteries, Nos. 1, 8 and 9, 
R.A., 1,2 and 5,Native. This was almost entirely an artillery battle, and 
the effect of combined fire completely drove off the enemy; heavy infantry 
fighting had however been looked for and a big casualty list. The 
fight ended by No. 5 Bombay M.B. being pushed forward, when 
Captain deButts, R.A., was killed on rounding a bluff at the head of 
his battery, which suddenly came under a fire from a ridge in front. 
Lieutenant Edlmann at once assumed command, and taking a sec¬ 
tion, closed in to 500 yards and cleared the ridge of the enemy, a 
most dashing feat for which he was commended in despatches. It is no 
small thing to stand to your guns at 500 yards range from marksmen 
armed with Martinis and Lee Metfords, but so does audacity bring its 
own reward in war, that wonderful to relate there were no more 
casualties in the section. 
Three days later the force crossed the Mastura Yalley, and forced 
the Arhanga Pass, the batteries again working by brigade divisions; 
few casualties occured among the British, and the heart of Tirah, the 
plateau of Maidan and Bagh was reached. After this, batteries 
were constantly engaged, generally singly; early in December the 
troops withdrew from Tirah and the scene shifted to the Khyber with 
several engagements but no massing of Artillery. The troops re- 
* For account of Dargai, see ‘Artillery at Dargai,’ by Lieutenant G. F. MacMunn, D.S.O..H.A., 
R.A.I. “ Proceedings”, Yol. XXY., No. 4, 1898. 
