THE EASTERN SOUDAN. 
275 
One of their three regiments was sent a detour round with orders to at¬ 
tack the rear of our column, containing our impedimenta, ammunition, 
etc. We felt that if we could repulse the attack we could get on 
the road to Gedarif and cut in between the Dervishes and their 
base. About half past eight the opposing forces had met. We were on 
our hill in column formation. The Dervishes stormed up the eastern 
slopes of the saddle back. We came into line to our left. Owing to 
having only one Egyptian officer on the staff, and there being no 
British officers available (no other Egyptian officer could be spared) 
most important messages and orders had on the field of battle to 
be sent verbally in Arabic by Arab Sheikhs to the British officers. 
For instance, notice of this turning movement on the part of the 
Dervishes to attack our baggage camels was sent to Captain Fleming 
of the R.A.M. Corps by an Arab Sheikh. It was the lack of officers 
that added so greatly to our difficulties throughout. He fortunately 
understood and had time to close up and successfully repulsed what 
eventually proved to be a most determined attack on the rear of our 
column. The Dervishes attacked with such fierceness as to approach 
within thirty yards of our baggage camels, losing 150 killed and wound¬ 
ed in the onslaught. We lost in that portion of the field forty Egypt¬ 
ian soldiers and fifty-eight camels; it was on this occasion that Ruthven 
gained his Victoria Cross (applause). He had been told about this 
turning movement and was watching that part of the battlefield. 
The Dervishes drove him back on the 16th battalion under McKerrell, 
and while retiring, one of his officers was lying on the ground badly 
wounded. During this retreat Ruthven alternately fired and carried 
this wounded Egyptian officer back to the 16th battalion (loud applause). 
The 16th Egyptian battalion behaved with great 
steadiness under exceptionally trying circumstances 
and by their soldier-like conduct saved the day ; 
had our ammunition column been destroyed the 
day would have been lost. Simultaneously with 
this desperate onslaught on the baggage the Arabs were advancing 
and driving the Dervishes off the eastern slopes of the saddle back, 
eventually completely routing them. As soon as the Arabs had driven 
these two regiments of Dervishes back, they were directed to seize the 
hill south-east of the scene of the fighting. This feature is really much 
larger than the map represents it to be. It completely commanded the 
Gedarif road and was the key of the position. 
It was 10 a.m. when the Dervishes had failed in 
Gallant 
conduct of 
Egyptian 
troops. 
Pursuit toy 
Ar;ib troops. 
their attacks and were being pursued by Colonel 
Lawson, R.E., and his Arabs in an easterly 
direction and by Major Wilkinson's Arabs in a westerly direction. 
Had we had mounted troops at our disposal we could have cut 
them all to pieces. Communication was at once established with 
Gedarif, where we ascertained that the Emir Nur Angora was waiting 
to surrender with 200 armed black soldiers and two brass guns. 
These brass guns were subsequently used by us on the 28th 
September, but with little effect as the fuzes would not act. 
19 
