THE EASTERN SOUDAN. 
277 
Alrtsbolx on 
Oedar^if toy 
Sinned W iecB.il 
repulsed. 
with his infantry. It was calculated from some very excellent maps 
furnished by our Intelligence Department at home, that the distance 
to Kassala from Gedarif via El Fasher was approximately the same 
as from Gedarif to Abu Haraz. I calculated on being able to get 
from Wad Akabu to Mugatta and back to Gedarif before Fedil could 
get to Gedarif from Abu Haraz. Fedil would not get the news of the 
fall of Gedarif before the 24th. We started from Wad Akabu much 
about the same time as Fedil would start from Abu Haraz. Riding 
hard, it was possible to do it. The Arab camel drivers at Mugatta had 
heard of the fightiug at Gedarif, on the 22nd September, and were 
alarmed; it was feared they might desert. By alternately threatening 
them and offering baksheesh, the ammunition caravan and self arrived 
from Mugatta at Gedarif at 2 p.m. on the 27th September. 
At 7 a.m., on the 28th September, Ruthven, who 
was out with his blacks reconnoitring, sent in word 
to say that he had seen forty Dervish horsemen 
about three miles off on the Abu Haraz road. He 
reported them as heading east, and also mentioned 
he had heard tomtomming. I sent for Nur Angora and asked him 
“ What does this mean? ” and he said, “ Well, there is no doubt about 
it, it is the advance-guard of Fedil.” We immediately stood to our 
rifles, taking post in three loopholed brickwall enclosures. The long 
durra stalks, some 10 feet high, had been cut down for a distance of 
800 yards from these enclosures between the 22nd and 27th September. 
These enclosures were in echelon, formerly the private establishments of 
Dervish Emirs, and situated on commanding ground, lending them¬ 
selves admirably for defence ; they happened to be the right size and 
required little doing to them. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 
28th September we were being attacked from the north, south and 
west. The attack lasted for one hour and then failed, none of the 
Dervishes being able to cross the open belt of 300 yards. It was a 
badly conceived attack on the part of the enemy. They had never 
reconnoitred our position and had imagined under cover of long grass 
they could approach to our walls, being totally unaware of the 
space that had been cleared. The first attack having failed, at 
10 in the morning another attack was launched by their second line, 
this also failed. At 12 o'clock our Arab troops sallied forth and 
cleared off the few Dervishes that remained. 
Fedil retired then to a clump of palm trees two miles 
west of our position, taking his force with him and 
remained there for two days till the 1st October ; 
Gettamf fpom during those two days he harassed us incessantly, 
firing into the place at night and threatening us on 
On 1st October he retired to GebalJAssar, eight 
miles south on the road from Gedarif to Karkou and continued the 
same harassing tactics, succeeding on one occasion in capturing a 
small convoy of eight camels, bringing specie [from Kassala. With 
such an extended line of communication and with such a very small 
force, the only way of keeping up communication at all was by leaving 
and entering the town by night. 
JUimed Fedil 
ttoes vicinity. 
all sides by day. 
