278 
THE EASTERN SOUDAN. 
Egyptian 
reinforce¬ 
ments 
Om cB/as. E»3saa E&xa • 
The situation was far from satisfactory and assis¬ 
tance was asked for, resulting in a force of about 
1,200 Soudanese, and some camel corps joining us 
after hard marching from Abu Haraz. The force 
that thus reinforced us came by boat from Omdurman 
to Abu Haraz and then across country to Gedarif, Lt.-Colonel Collinson, 
Northampton Regiment, being in command. The march was a very 
severe one, and rendered difficult on account of scarcity of water 
between Abu Haraz and Gedarif. General Rundle organized and 
equipped this force with great difficulty owing to scarcity of camel 
transport. He had heard of the awkward situation in which we found 
ourselves, and being at the time G.O.C. the Soudan, did everything he 
possibly could to help us. We were all sorry his duties on the Blue 
Nile prevented him leaving the river and coming himself with the force 
he sent over under Lt.-Colonel Collinson. The reinforcements arrived 
on the 21st October, and on the 22nd the Dervishes made a feeble 
attack after dark ; we lost two wounded on our side. 
O n ^be ^3rd October a strong reconnaissance was 
made in the direction of Gebal Assar, when Fedil was 
pefwises tea?ms se en moving in a southerly direction, having left a 
strong rear-guard with the double object of covering 
his retreat and preventing deserters coming to us. Nur Angora 
all this time had been working with success on our behalf. He 
bad informed the Dervishes of the fall of Omdurman and flight 
of the Khalifa, facts of which they were apparently ignorant until 
after the fighting on the 28th September. This may be accounted 
for partly by the fact that the news of the fall of Omdurman was sent 
to Fedil by one of the Khalifa’s jail officials, who had been taken pri¬ 
soner at Omdurman. This man who brought this news of the fall of 
Omdurman was killed by Fedil, in order to prevent the news spread¬ 
ing. In the same way, on being informed from sundry sources that 
Fedil was inclined to surrender, we sent terms of surrender to him by 
a messenger, who was one of Fedil’s own tribe. We thought he would 
spare one of his own clan, but he did not, he killed him. Fedil res¬ 
ponded to my letter by attacking us. Through lack of sufficient 
transport, the numerical inferiority and fever stricken state of the 
Gedarif garrison, it was impossible to organize a sufficiently strong 
force to hold Gedarif, and at the same time carry on an effective 
pursuit, in what was practically a waterless desert in the country 
between Gedarif and Karkou. In numbers we were one to their five; 
as regards fever, one morning sick report shewed 270 Egyptian 
soldiers down out of a strength of 450. 
Many Soudanese came over after the retreat from 
Gebal Assar commenced, they began to realize it 
was no use going on, and felt they had had enough 
fighting. 500 Soudanese in a body under their 
Emir, a Darfur chieftain, named Abu Bakr, surren¬ 
dered on the 24th October. The Etnir and these 500 men were asked 
on parade why they attacked us on the 28th September, ramming their 
0-KB.3s?K»<oBra.dLe!i? o£ 
Boudanese 
'sasrira.o ttrarmi 
