BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 
323 
armoured ships, only the two cruisers had greater nominal speed than 
the Spanish ships, namely from twenty-one to twenty-two knots. 
None of the battle-ships reached eighteen knots. 
Clearly, it was specially needful that the Spanish ships should coal 
and, if possible, attend to their bottoms during tlieir forty-four days 
imprisonment. Complete cleaning needs a dry dock, which did not 
exist. A fair cleaning may be done by divers; probably these were 
not forthcoming. There remains, however, something to be done by 
working from boats and dragging lines round under the ships. 
When a difference of a single knot may determine success, this surely 
should have been attempted, but it does not appear to have been 
thought of for no expression of regret at its non-performance is found. 
On the morning of July 3rd, 1893, the Spanish cruisers broke out. The 
task was supremely dangerous, and the Spanish officers regarded it as 
desperate. Hopeless, however, it certainly was not, and at the 
moment some circumstances favoured the attempt. The entrance of 
the harbour was deep, though a long vessel must move slowly to get 
through safely. Once clear, it was necessary to run the gauntlet of 
the fire of such ships as might be prompt enough to get within range. 
Then would follow a chase. The Spanish ships ought to have the 
advantage of getting up steam first, and the United States vessels had 
half their engines uncoupled. On the morning of the 3rd the New 
York , Admiral Sampson's flagship, had moved off seven miles to the 
east and the Massachusetts’ place had been temporarily taken by the 
Indiana. The Diagram shows how the ships lay. They had rather 
drifted during the night towards the south-east, the western end of 
the line being, as usual, filled by the Brooklyn , cruiser. Admiral 
Cervera's plan was to break through at this west end of the line, and 
then run west. By this means it might be hoped that the only vessel 
dealt with at close quarters would be the Brooklyn, for the others 
might not be ready enough to close instantly, and unless they did so 
they could effect but little, for their speed ought to be inferior to that 
of the Spanish cruisers. The Spanish ships in passing, were all to 
deliver their fire into the Brooklyn, so as to cripple her, if possible. 
By this means, there was a fair hope of escape, at all events for the 
time. So far I should judge that most naval officers would concur 
with Admiral Cervera, but I should think no further.* The Admiral 
himself led in the Maria Teresa and meant to take the brunt of the 
firing. The Vizcaya came second and was, if possible, to ram the 
Brooklyn. This is open to most serious objections. It would be a 
very sanguine man who would expect the Vizcaya to escape after 
ramming the Brooklyn, though no doubt the latter ship would cease to 
be a danger to the remaining Spanish vessels. 
Moreover, this selection of the vessels for their appointed tasks was 
singularly unfortunate. A ship possessing Q.F. guns should have been 
chosen to perform the firing and prepare the way, if possible, for the 
* This paper deals only with the actual operations attempted, that is breaking 1 out by day. 
The question of the better chances offered by a night attempt is not entered upon. 
