324 
BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 
others. As "noticed hereafter, the Colon should surely have been 
selected on the ground of her armour and her Q.F. guns; but apart 
from the question of protection, it showed a want of appreciation of 
the power of quick-fire to direct the Maria Teresa with her miserably 
small energy (see Diagram) to undertake the fire, and the Vizcaya 
to ram and thus to lose the opportunity of using her Q.F. broadside 
guns. 
At 9.35 a.m. the Spanish vessels came out in the following order :— 
Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, Colon and Oquendo, followed by the two 
destroyers. The Americans showed extraordinary promptness in 
closing on the mouth of the harbour, so that the battle-ships Texas, 
Iowa, Oregon and Indiana, all brought their fire to bear. An analysis 
of the results of the fire shows that the percentage of hits was very small. 
We could surely expect nothing else. The call was sudden, and 
unless a hit could be made speedily the enemy would be out of range, 
and as the only vessel of either fleet using smokeless powder was the 
Colon, it is easy to see that smoke would shroud the ships to a 
great extent, as indeed is actually reported. In about eight minutes 
from the time when the smoke was first seen to be moving towards 
the mouth of the harbour, the United States ships had advanced and 
opened fire. The general direction was north-west, but the Brooklyn 
went about turning her head east, and then south to west, to avoid 
ramming, discharging her port broadside, and then running parallel to 
the Spanish ships and using her starboard guns against them. The 
Gloucester moved south and then turned after the destroyers, closing 
and hotly attacking them. The fire of the battle-ships (although they 
were practically deficient of all Q.F. guns, except very light ones) 
aided by the Brooklyn and Gloucester, sank the Furor, caused the 
Pluton destroyer, to run on shore, set on fire the Teresa and 
Oquendo, and swept down their men so that they turned inshore at 
about six-and-half and seven miles respectively from the harbour 
mouth. The Vizcaya ran nearly twenty miles and then turned in¬ 
shore, burning hopelessly. The artillery interest centres in the part 
played by the Colon. She ran past the Vizcaya on the shore side, 
and thus escaped some of the American fire.* She gained a lead of 
four or five miles, then her speed failed, and the Brooklyn (though 
running with her forward engines uncoupled) and the Oregon overtook 
her so far as to bring her under fire. The Texas and New York were 
following, and the captain ran ashore and surrendered. 
The Spanish fire hardly injured the American ships. How came it 
that the Brooklyn did not suffer at all when the Spanish ships succumbed 
so immediately to the American fire ? The answer is that the fire was 
very badly directed. The official drawing of the Brooklyn (see 
Diagram) shows about twenty-five hits of some kind on funnels, 
deck structures, cranes, and turrets above the freeboard, and about 
* It may be questioned if the Colon without previous arrangement would have been justified in 
running between the Brooklyn and Vizcaya, both firing hard and both using smoke giving powder 
and Q.F. guns. 
