328 
BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 
It may be questioned if even the American officers fully appreciated 
the difference between the Colon and her consorts. This is the more 
remarkable as Admiral Sampson is a high authority on armour. Let 
us read his order of battle on May 22nd. It contains the following 
paragraph :—“ While the Vizcaya, Maria Teresa and Oquendo have 
“ strong protection on barbettes and water line, they have no protection 
elsewhere, and are vulnerable to even 6-prs. Fire should be con¬ 
centrated on the centre part of these ships just above the water line. 
“ In case of the Cristobal Colon , her belt and barbette armour is inferior 
to that of the other ships, but her protection elsewhere extends over 
“a larger area. None of this armour is face hardened.” 
Surely this is rather a hint than a distinct order as to the different 
attacks required. My idea would have been something like this. 
“ Be sure to distinguish the Colon , who is covered with hard faced 6-in. 
“ armour, which can only be perforated by A.P. projectiles from guns of 
“8-in. and larger calibres. The other cruisers have heavy belts only 
“ and may be easily destroyed by shell attack.” 
In former times in battles in the field, matters were left to chance 
to a great extent which gradually have been brought down to 
calculation. Many of the elements thus dealt with are beset with 
uncertainty, yet it would be ruinous not to deal with them as far as is 
feasible. Nevertheless in the present day there are those who think it 
unpractical to deal with the fixed and known elements of ships armour 
and guns, and here we have ships lying inside and outside a harbour 
and growing weary of doing nothing week after week, with information 
doubtless in their hands which would guide them, yet we are compelled 
to question if even all the fundamental elements of success were clearly 
grasped by the gunnery officers of either fleet. We see a ship, the 
Colon, so situated that a brilliant part was open to her and the 
opportunity was altogether unperceived, an opportunity which might 
have made the fate of Santiago a different story. 
DISCUSSION. 
By direction of the Chairman the Secretary read a letter from Colonel Sir George S. Clarke, 
K.c.m.g., R.E., Superintendent of the Royal Carriage Factory, Woolwich, regretting his unavoidable 
absence and offering the following remarks on the lecture, a precis of which had been sent to him 
beforehand 
Sir George Clarke, k.c.m.g. : —There are a few points on which I do not 
quite agree with Captain Orde Browne. It must be remembered that Admiral 
Cervera left Santiago only on receiving position orders from Marshal Blanco, 
under whom he had been, most unwisely, placed by the Spanish Government. 
Cervera knew the state of his fleet, and was under no illusions. From the first, 
he had warned his Government that he was going across the Atlantic to court 
certain destruction. “ With an easy conscience,” he wrote from St. Vincent, “ I 
go to the sacrifice; but I cannot understand the decision of the Navy general 
officers against my opinions.” On June 24th when he was being urged by 
Marshal Blanco to escape, he telegraphed “ You will decide whether we are to go 
further to the sacrifice, which I consider useless.” 
In the state in which the squadron found itself on July 3rd, I do not think it 
mattered what ship lead the column. There was no reasonable chance of 
ramming any American ship, and the Vizcaya s attempt, if it was an attempt, did 
