BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 
329 
not go beyond a temporary swerve out of column. The only question for the 
Spaniards was whether they could draw clear before being disabled and maintain 
their speed. The Colon would have been able to reach Havana if she had been 
able to keep up another knot and a half. As it was she averaged only 13‘7 
knots and was unable to maintain 15 knots. 
Again, I do not think the Colon would have had any chance in a single action 
with the Brooklyn. The armaments were :— 
Colon . 10-6-in. Q.F. and 6-4'7-in. Q.F. 
Brooklyn . ... 8-8-in. B.L. and 12-5-in. Q.F. 
The disparity in Q.F. is not great and we knew that the Colon s gunners were 
quite untrained, whereas the Brooklyn's men were in excellent form and highly 
practised. Neither the Colon s small superiority of armament nor her side 
armour would have availed her. It is the man behind the gun that counts now 
as always. 
For these reasons I do not think that the Santiago action is “ an example of 
the decisive results that may follow the neglect to recognize fundamental 
differences in character between ships.” A superior fleet in good order with well 
trained gunners destroyed an inferior fleet in thoroughly bad condition, and with 
untrained gunners. I do not see that any recognition of differences in character 
of ships could possibly have made any difference in the result. 
Lastly, I think that to discriminate between “ belt attack ” and “ shell attack ” 
is a refinement too great for practical purposes. To hit an enemy’s ship any¬ 
where is as much as the naval gunners can hope for. The Americans were 
probably as well trained gunners as any afloat. They had an exceptional amount 
of practice. They were not themselves subject to any disturbing effect from the 
enemy’s tire. Yet we find that on the large targets offered by the Spanish 
cruisers, only the following hits were scored, viz :— 
13-in. 
47 rounds 
nil. 
12-in. 
• 39 „ 
2 
8-in. 
219 „ 
12 
6-in. 
271 „ 
3 
5-in. 
Q.F. 473 „ 
15 
With these figures before us, I believe that it is hopeless to expect to carry on 
a “ belt attack.” It is also worth noticing that in percentage of hits the 12-in. 
and 8-in. guns easily beat the 5-in. Q.F. The naval gunner has a legitimate 
cause for pride if he hits his enemy’s ship anywhere and cannot hope to select 
individual areas to attack. 
Lieutenant H. Chamberlain, late Royal Navy:—Colonel Jocelyn and gentlemen. 
I open the discussion with an apology for doing so being a retired officer, but I 
still take a great interest in naval questions. The first point that struck me as 
regards affairs at Santiago is, should the Admiral have been under the orders of a 
military officer on shore ? I have just been reading Lord Lyons’ life, and I believe 
that in the Crimea Lord Lyons was not under the orders of Lord Raglan. In 
other words, the naval portion of his business was left to him, and Lord Raglan 
managed military operations. In the French service at that time Canrobert and 
Pelissier both had Bruat under their orders, and that helped to cripple our ex¬ 
pedition against Kertch. That I look upon as the administrative defect of that 
campaign; and you will bear in mind that administration comes before efficient 
action, and it is defective administration which frequently leads to failure in war. 
Anybody who has read an extremely useful work, called “ Naval Administrations,” 
by Sir John Briggs, will agree with that view. The book is well worth reading 
if only to show that unless you have efficient administration you cannot expect 
