336 
BATTLE OE SANTIAGO. 
The Chairman I will now call upon Captain Orde Browne to kindly reply. 
REPLY. 
Captain Orde Browne :—With regard to Sir George Clarke’s letter, I have the 
highest opinion of Sir George Clarke’s judgement, and I agree with the first part of 
the letter, though not with last. With regard to the ramming it was evident 
that the ship which had the ramming to do would certainly lose at the instant of 
ramming the best opportunity of delivering her fire. The selection of vessels 
for their tasks with a view to their powers certainly ought to be considered, and 
I do not believe for a moment that if Admiral Cervera had sat down and put 
into shape any such summary as is attempted in those tables he would have 
acted as he did. He selected the Teresa with very small fire energy to do the 
firing and the Vizcaya to waste her large broadside fire energy to do the ram¬ 
ming, and the Colon with a large amount of fire, and covered nearly all over with 
6-in. hardened plates, did hardly anything, running past the Vizcaya on the shore 
side. Sir George Clarke seems to speak as if shells were available everywhere 
but if Sir George Clarke were here I would point out to him that there were only 
two weak patches on the Colon, the rest is covered with armour which, for any 
shell to get through if struck direct, is equivalent to 12-inches of iron, and at 
30° is equal to 16-inches of iron. Then with regard to discrimination of attack 
I wrote a paper in “ Brasseys Annual ” of 1893 in which I dealt with the question of 
accuracy of firing in action; and I referred there to the feeling of despair that 
creeps over a man in having something complicated to do at a supreme moment. 
Now there is nothing more simple than the general rule which is given to fall 
back upon in all cases of doubt or difficulty, namely : aim at the hull, near the 
foremast with your principal guns with shell fire, and further direct some quick- 
firing guns on any deck structure near the funnel or foremast. The object of the 
first is to indicate the best place to attack in case of doubt—a place where shells 
may tell in most ships ; and the object of the second is to keep the directing 
intelligence of the ship closed up in its conning tower if you do not hit it. No 
one can fail to recognise a mast or a funnel. It is most desirable to have a simple 
rule of that sort to fall back upon in case of doubt; but why limit yourself to 
the low standard that is fixed as attainable by the most stupid or the most nervous 
man or by a man acting under the most difficult circumstances ? Surely there are 
conditions when it is possible to do better. I very strongly oppose the idea 
which I have heard expressed as the practical view, namely: that the moment 
people begin to fire at you you are turned into a sort of idiot. I do not think for a 
moment, that officers who have had actual experience under fire would admit this. 
May I point out that the small undefended space beneath the turret in some 
ships represents the size of the target that the Navy habitually fire at in annual 
practice. It is marked out on the side of the ship in a figure in the article re¬ 
ferred to in “ Brasseys Annual ” for 1898. Surely then there are circumstances 
when you ought to do something better than hit the ship anywhere, especially in 
the case of coast defences, in which you have a fixed platform. The same thing 
applies to identification. We have all learned that despatch boats practice all 
sorts of disguises ; but you do not mean to tell me that a thing like this model, 
viz. : the Charlemagne or Iioche is going to disguise itself. It is heavy 
armour clads that might come and attack forts, I do not mean a fort like those 
at Portsmouth, Dover or Gibraltar. It might happen to some poor coaling 
station, which, coals having attained a high figure in these days, might be attacked ; 
and surely it is very desireable that the defenders should be able to recognise 
their enemy and attack her with discrimination. 
