90 
COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OP A SIEGE TRAIN 
until our new batteries liaye deadened the fire of the artillery of the 
curtain,” to which may • be added, that, from the time the latter 
batteries opened the artillery of the attack was superior to that of the 
defence and the work proceeded. 
If then, as these remarks shew, in the days of S.B. ordnance, it was 
obligatory on the besieger to subdue the fire of the besieged, how much 
more is it so now in the days of rifled ordnance, which are of far greater 
destructive power, while the means of protection, on the side of the 
besieger against that fire, remains but about the same as formerly. 
Brialmont, with reference to this, truly remarks, The zone in which 
the artillery of the defence can acquire a marked preponderance over 
that of the attack is much extended since the invention of rifled guns 
and the employment of the electric light.” 
But in order to subdue the fire of the defence the besieger must 
establish a superiority of fire, as Kraft points out when he says, 
speaking of the first batteries of the attack, j* * * § “ That their number 
should be so regulated that a superiority of fire may be established over 
the enemy from the very first.” 
We may therefore say, that, in general, J for the attack of a fortress 
the besieger must have sufficient ordnance for : 
Obtaining superiority over the fire of the place. 
^Effecting breaches. 
Assisting in driving the enemy within his works , in repelling 
sorties and in effecting lodgements on captured worhs. 
Such being the requirements of the attack, when we consider that 
the numbers necessary for the two last named purposes can be but 
small as compared to the first, it is evident that the actual ordnance 
required for the siege of any fortress must mainly depend, as regards 
a minimum, upon the ordnance mounted in that fortress, and in par¬ 
ticular upon that front against which the attack is directed, as well as 
upon the disposition of the works themselves, not only of the front 
attacked but of the collateral fronts. 
In fact—the calibres being given — <c The exact number of pieces of 
ordnance required for the reduction of a fortress can only be correctly 
ascertained by the joint labours of the heads of the Artillery and 
Engineer service, after the plan of attack has been decided upon.”|| 
Though the case stands thus, it is however necessary to have a 
definitely organized siege train in readiness in the event of war,§ so 
that, as soon as war breaks out and a siege has to be undertaken, the 
train can be set in motion without waiting for details to be determined; 
* Brialmont, Traite de Fortification Polygonale. 
f On Sieges, by Kraft, Prince of Hohenlobe-Ingelfingen, Major-General, Inspector of 
the lltli Artillery (Prussian) Inspection. 
$ “ All general rules must occasionally be deviated from, genius will sometimes supply 
the place of numbers and necessity oblige where calculation condemns.” Note 28, Journal 
of Sieges, by Sir J. Joues. 
|| Note 29, Journal of Sieges in Spain, by Sir J. Jones. 
§ Si vis pacem, para bellum, 
