ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
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the entrenchment of a position, which has been most ably done by 
Captain Fraser, R.E., in his Royal Engineer Prize Essay. 
The question of the position of the reserves is of some importance. 
The loss of the battle of Gravelotte by the French may be attributed, 
in some degree, at all events, to the fact that Bazaine, tearing quite 
unnecessarily for his left flank and communications with Metz, kept 
his reserves on the plateau of Flappeville in rear of his left, and only 
sent aid to Canrobert, on the right, too late to save St. Privat, and the 
consequent compromising of the whole of the French position. Two 
considerations influence the posting of the reserves ; in the first place 
they should be within reach of the points on which the enemy’s chief 
attacks are likely to be directed, and in the second place they should 
be favourably placed for making offensive counterstrokes. They may 
either be kept in one mass, or divided into several parts as will best 
fulfil these conditions. If there is reason to expect a serious attempt 
of the enemy to turn a flank of the position, the best way to meet it 
would appear to be by troops placed ready in echelon behind the 
threatened flank in such a way as to take the flank attack itself in 
flank. The body of troops intended to guard against the turning 
movement may even be stationed at some distance from the extremity 
of the position, so as to be in a situation to come up in rear of the 
enemy’s turning movement. The Duke of W ellington at Waterloo 
had Chasse’s Division in such a position at Braine l’Alleud during the 
early part of the battle. If a body of troops be thus detached it may 
be connected with head-quarters by field-telegraph, as Colonel Hamley 
suggests.* 
Let us now consider the method in which a defensive action will be 
carried on. During the first stage, that of the reconnaissance of the 
position by the enemy, the defenders should not be tempted to show 
more of their force and dispositions than is necessary. The enemy’s 
attacks must, of course, be warded off, but only so much infantry 
and artillery should be shewn as will suffice for this. It will not 
generally be possible to prevent the enemy from obtaining a more or 
less exact idea of the nature and extent of the position occupied, but 
he need not be allowed to find out the position of more guns than are 
absolutely required to keep in check those which he brings up, or to 
discover the position of the reserves 
As soon, however, as the enemy begins to show signs of preparing 
for serious attack by developing large masses of artillery, then all the 
batteries of defence (except those with the reserve) should occupy 
themselves with trying to prevent the obtaining of a superiority of 
fire by the attack. 
That there will be an artillery duel at the commencement of a battle 
is therefore exceedingly probable. The artillery of the attack must 
silence more or less completely the artillery of the defence, or no 
attack can be made with any prospect of success, and until this is 
done it will not be able to direct its fire on the infantry line of the 
* Operations of War, 3rd Ed,, p. 437. 
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