SIEGE TRAINS. 
151 
or brickwork, however strong, must rapidly succumb to the direct 
battering of such guns as the 7-inch or 64-pr., even supposing 
their projectiles to be only charged with gunpowder. It is, more¬ 
over, apparent that the fire of the guns exposed behind such open 
shields as have been adopted for the sea faces of coast batteries, 
could with ease be kept down by the light guns of the attack, 
whilst the process of demolishing the intervening masonry pro¬ 
ceeded. 
It would, of course, be necessary to reduce one or more of these 
isolated strongholds before any advance could be attempted on 
the main works of the besieged, and as their heavy artillery might 
fairly be expected to sweep away any fieldwork of the ordinary 
type which it would be possible to construct in a single night, the 
only chance of establishing breaching batteries within a reason¬ 
able distance of such works would appear to be in the employment 
of guns mounted on the Moncrieff principle, placed in pits or 
trenches, or sunk behind such inequalities of ground as would 
render them safe from the direct fire of any gun that might be 
brought against them. 
By multiplying the number of 7-inch and 64-pr. guns, and em¬ 
ploying them, as above suggested, for “ over-bank direct fire ” at 
distances of 800 to 1,000 yards, supplementing them largely with 
8 and 6'3-inch howitzers, for “curved fire,” the superior weight 
of metal thrown by the defenders might be counterbalanced, 
without resorting to the employment of heavier guns, which could 
only be taken to a siege by railway, and into the trenches by 
tramways and locomotives. 
It is quite within the bounds of reason to anticipate that the 
plating of forts with iron will be extended to land-fronts, and that 
“ muzzle-pivotting ” carriages may be introduced for casemates, in 
which case guns of 12 and 18 tons would have to be taken to the 
front; but any dissertation on this large question would be out of 
place here, the object of the Essay being presumably the develop¬ 
ment of a siege train in the sense of the term hitherto accepted, 
viz., such as would, under ordinary circumstances, accompany an 
army on a campaign, and be capable of travelling over rough 
roads and such ground as the approaches to the trenches might be 
expected to present. 
Having sketched as above the capabilities and resources of the 
defence, the next subject for consideration is 
The Proportion op Ordnance that should be allotted 
to Siege Trains. 
The Ordnance Select Committee, in 1864, recorded their opinion 
that “ now-a-days there can be no such thing as a pattern Siege 
Train, as the composition of any Siege Train must depend upon 
the nature of the operations to be provided for and the theatre of 
war.” Further, “that a certain number of 20-pr., 40-pr., 64-pr., 
the defence in 
future. 
Masonry and 
brickwork de¬ 
fences. 
Iron-plated 
embrasures. 
Moncrieff 
system the 
best for close 
attack. 
Possibility of 
meeting the 
heavy artillery 
of the defence 
with a largely 
increased num¬ 
ber of heavy 
siege guns, 
capable of 
travelling over 
ordinary roads, 
without resort¬ 
ing to railways. 
Ironclad forts, 
and muzzle- 
pivotting car¬ 
riages. 
The propoi> 
tion of ord¬ 
nance for siege 
trains to be 
determined at 
the time of 
opening a 
campaign. 
