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ROCKET SHELLS, ANI) ARTILLERY OF THE FUTURE. 
BY 
LIEUT. E. N. HENRIQUES, R.A. 
Haying frequently heard thoughtful artillerists regret the withdrawal 
of rockets from field and siege service generally,*' I have been led to 
consider the defects which caused them to be so far given up, and to 
enquire whether the rocket principle can be retained with such modi¬ 
fications as will render it an useful adjunct in modern warfare. 
The undoubted end of all military engagements is to break down as 
rapidly as possible the moral force of the enemy. 
However great the carnage and destruction of materiel , as long as 
the survivors have the morale or resolution to stand their ground, the 
fight remains undecided. 
This is the hinge on which alone the fate of battles depends, but 
which is so often disregarded by military writers in estimating the 
value of projectiles by their physical effects alone—thus mistaking one 
of the means for breaking the resolution of the enemy and putting 
him to flight as the one end of artillery fire. 
If, then,' there be other means to be added—more rapid, simple, and 
certain than slaughter pure and simple—by which the moral force 
which makes a man stand up and face danger in the field of battle, 
rather than follow his natural instincts and fly from it, can be broken 
down, it will be an advantage of the most solid kind to the army em¬ 
ploying them. The art of destruction has already been carried to a 
very high pitch of excellence, to the partial neglect of other influences; 
and I believe that a great deal may yet be done to increase the effect 
of modern arms of precision by directing attention to the other means 
by which the morale of armies is destroyed. 
Against these views it can no doubt be urged with truth, u He that 
fights and runs away, lives to fight another day.” This drawback is, 
however, more apparent than real, and there will be found to exist 
advantages which, when the balance is struck, will far outweigh it. 
The losses suffered by opposing armies on the field of battle are 
usually pretty nearly even during the main part of an engagement, and 
it is principally in the retreat of a defeated army that it suffers large 
disproportionate losses from an active pursuit which renders its defeat 
decisive and crushing. It therefore appears that the losses in actual 
battle array are of minor importance to putting the enemy as rapidly 
as possible to flight, and pressing him hotly by a vigorous pursuit. The 
material gain to the victor will then be increased; the less materiel is 
* See “ Army Equipment Regulations,” 1876, par. 112. “ War rockets will not form any portion 
of the equipment of fortresses ; they will only be employed with siege trains and in the field, as 
occasions and circumstances demand.” 
