role oe horse artillery. 
317 
might be added, if there should be any special need for their services, 
one or more horse batteries of the corps artillery. As a rule, however, 
it would be undesirable to attach a large number of batteries to this 
force, for its business is “ not to fight, but to watch and report; ” * * * § and 
by unnecessarily augmenting the artillery, the services of a consider¬ 
able force of cavalry would be taken up in escorting or supporting it, 
and the commander might be tempted to assume a role by no means 
suited to the part of the cavalry veil. It may, however, be fairly 
questioned whether the cavalry of the advance will always be able to 
carry out the duties assigned to it without some use of force. Since 
the development of the strategic veil, no campaigns have been fought, 
in which the cavalry forces on both sides have been at all equally 
matched.f Where this is the case, unless some force is used, the 
cavalry of two hostile armies will probably simply neutralise each 
other. We find Napoleon III. blaming his cavalry leaders in the 
Franco-German War for not having penetrated the enemy’s cavalry 
veil.! Again, the author of the Royal Artillery Institution Prize 
Essay for 1876 recommends the increase of the horse artillery with 
the cavalry of the advance, on the ground that one surplus battery may 
succeed in “rending the enemy’s strategic veil beyond repair for the 
campaign.” § 
The duties of the horse artillery attached to the cavalry of the 
advance will be confined to supporting the cavalry and co-operating 
with it in any attempt to penetrate the enemy’s cavalry veil, or to force 
back his cavalry upon the main body ; frustrating any similar attempt 
on his part; extricating the cavalry from an engagement. 
To lay down any rules for the action of the horse artillery, when per¬ 
forming these duties, is manifestly impossible. It may be stated broadly 
that, if on the offensive, it should seek the enemy’s flanks, especially when 
attacking any points that have been artifically strengthened; if on the de¬ 
fensive, it should endeavour to take up commanding positions on or near 
to the main roads. It is scarcely necessary to add that it must always be 
where it can rely upon the immediate tactical support of a considerable 
force of cavalry. On the march it will generally be advisable to keep 
to the main roads, not only on account of the extra labour which bad 
or indifferent roads will entail on the draught horses, but also because it 
is on the main roads and at central points that the principal oppor¬ 
tunities for its action will occur. It is evident that for the efficient 
performance of its duties the greatest mobility is necessary, and it must 
under all circumstances be able to keep up with the cavalry, otherwise 
it will only hamper the movements of the latter. The force will have 
to act quite independently of, and at considerable distances from, the 
main body. It must be prepared to make long marches, and to con- 
* “ Precis of Modern Tactics.” Home. 
t That the part of strategic veil was not developed in the war of 1866, the following will 
show : “ Thus the outposts of both armies faced each other on this day, within a distance of 
miles, without either army suspecting the near and concentrated approach of the other.” 
Official account, translated by Hozier and Wright. 
$ “ Campagne de 1870. Par un officier attache a l’Etat Major General.” 
§ Royal Artillery Institution Proceedings, vol. ix., p. 442. 
