ROLE OF HORSE ARTILLERY, 
319 
act with far greater boldness than would be justifiable for an infantry 
force under similar circumstances, for its power of rapid movement 
would enable it to be comparatively indifferent about its flanks and 
rear, especially if the attacking force should be composed of less mobile 
troops. It is on occasions such as these that the advantages possessed 
by troops fighting behind hastily constructed entrenchments, which 
have been brought so much into prominence during the recent war, 
will probably exercise a great influence both on strategy and tactics. 
When the object of this independent force is to hold a position, a part 
of the artillery would be employed with the dismounted cavalry in the 
defence, taking care to entrench itself when time allows, whilst the 
remainder with a cavalry force would be kept in hand to act offensively 
and to threaten the enemy’s flanks should he attack. 
A force of cavalry and artillery employed to hold an enemy fast in 
a position will naturally be as strong as possible in guns, and field 
batteries may be freely used in combination with the horse artillery 
and cavalry. As its object must be to keep the enemy at a distance, 
and to avoid bringing on a serious engagement, it must be careful to 
keep out of the range of the effective fire of infantry; and must be 
prepared to withdraw, if seriously attacked. It must not, however, 
fall into the error of allowing the enemy, by assuming the offensive, 
to accomplish his object of withdrawing from the position, leaving only 
a rear guard, and if necessary it must be prepared to sacrifice much, 
in order to stay his retreat. If protected by cavalry on its flanks, it 
should be able to hold its ground against any infantry attack in 
front. At Mars-la-Tour, the German artillery, without the support of 
infantry, succeeded in repulsing every attempt of the French infantry 
to advance to the attack of the guns. # As soon as ever the French 
infantry showed themselves, they were exposed to such an accurate 
and destructive fire from the German guns, that they were always 
obliged to retire. 
The occasion of an enemy’s making a flank march is one which offers 
great opportunities to the cavalry and artillery, and which should ever 
be turned to the best account. The operation is so difficult and 
delicate, and the results of failure so disastrous, that it will generally be 
worth while to risk much in order to make the most of it. Whilst a 
small force of cavalry endeavours to break up the roads in front of the 
enemy and to impede his progress, the remainder, with all the avail¬ 
able horse artillery, and even with field batteries, should attack his 
columns with the greatest boldness and vigour. Troops, especially when 
on the march, are so susceptible to flank attacks, that it will be com¬ 
paratively easy to produce confusion and demoralisation amongst them. 
Even should this force not be able to drive the enemy’s columns off the 
roads or force him to form front to a flank, it may at least so delay his 
march, harass his movements, and demoralise his troops, as to enable 
its own main body to come up and attack him at a disadvantage, or to 
devote the time gained to manoeuvring. 
* Hoffbauer. 
