Retreats. 
Pursuits. 
320 ROLE OF HORSE ARTILLERY® 
The action of a force of cavalry and horse artillery employed to 
cover the flank of an army making a flank march will be similar to that 
of the cavalry veil, with this exception, that it will have to be prepared 
to fight, and must therefore be very strong in artillery. The whole 
flank of the column must be covered by cavalry scouts, with supports 
and reserves at central points. In order to provide for the security of 
the exposed flank, and to give timely notice of the enemy’s approach, 
the force should be at a considerable distance from the main body, and 
should not depend Upon it for support. It must be prepared to con¬ 
centrate upon any point, and to act against the enemy’s cavalry and 
horse artillery. 
The above are but a few of the instances of the independent action of 
cavalry and artillery. It is easy to conceive of many other cases in 
which they might render signal services during a campaign. It may 
be said, in fact, that there is hardly any limit to the employment of such 
a force for the carrying out of objects at such distances from the main 
body of an army as to render the action of infantry impossible. 
Retreats .—The objects which the cavalry and artillery will be called 
upon to secure during a retreat, and the manner of their employment, 
will be identical in almost every particular with those of the force 
covering the exposed flank of an army making a flank march. The 
duties of this force must not be confounded with those of the rear 
guard, with which they have little in common. During a retreat, the 
safety of the army depends, in a great measure, upon the handling of 
the covering force of cavalry and artillery. There is no duty in war 
which calls for a greater display of the highest military qualities, for to 
perform it efficiently this force must be superior to the demoralising 
and disheartening influences which are sure to affect the main body in 
a greater or less degree. Its position must not be in rear of the 
retreating army, but on its flank, for it is there that the enemy will 
endeavour to inflict his blows. To adopt the old plan of blocking the 
roads in rear of a retreating army with cavalry is not only to make a 
manifestly improper use of one of the chief weapons of cavalry, the 
speed and power of its horses,* but also to confer a great advantage 
upon the enemy, who would be at liberty to outflank the rear guard, and 
attack the flanks of the retreating infantry, with little fear of moles¬ 
tation. The result, moreover, of a sudden panic amongst a large 
cavalry force closing the retreat of an army—and no troops are so 
liable to sudden panics as cavalry—would probably be fatal to the 
whole force.f 
Pursuits .—The retaining power and the increased range of breech¬ 
loading small-arms have undoubtedly taken something from the power 
formerly possessed by cavalry and horse artillery of converting a defeat 
into a rout. It will rarely be safe to assume that beaten infantry are 
* “ Prdcis of Modern Tactics.” Home, 
t “ The French Cavalry.” Col. Bouie. 
