ROLE OF HORSE ARTILLERY. 
323 
notice, and that he will therefore be in a position to adopt any pre¬ 
cautionary measures that may be needful. The truth is that the term 
“ reserve artillery ” is evidently misleading, and has been the cause of 
artillery being kept out of action till too late to have any effect on the 
fortunes of the day. This was undoubtedly the case with the French 
artillery at the battle of Gravelotte. It seems to be possible, however, 
to fall into an error exactly the reverse of this, viz., to hurry every 
available gun into action against the enemy the moment his position is 
discovered, without waiting to consider how he may be attacked to the 
greatest advantage. The artillery of the German 9th Corps fell into 
this error at the same battle (Gravelotte—St. Privat), when it 
rashly advanced to the attack of the French position, Amanvillers— 
Montigny-la-Grange, unsupported by infantry and utterly ignorant of 
the dispositions of the enemy. The result of this attack was that the 
batteries engaged suffered enormous losses; the general plan had to 
be modified, and it was deemed necessary to occupy the attention of the 
French by an attack on their left and left centre, which proved not only 
unsuccessful, but extremely costly. # Between these two extremes it is 
surely possible to find the proverbially safe middle course. It is hardly 
too much to expect at the present day that an artillery attack should be 
made with some plan. If it is to be laid down as a rule, as seems to be 
generally assumed, that an artillery attack is to consist of a mere con¬ 
centration of all available guns on the batteries of the advanced guard, 
then artillery tactics have become at once simple and unscientific. It 
cannot but be possible to find some modification of such a plan. Most 
writers divide the artillery attack into two or three periods, the first of 
which is devoted to searching out the enemy’s position, feeling for the 
weak points, and endeavouring to draw the fire of his guns, while the 
commander is deciding upon his plan, and the infantry is deploying for 
the attack. There can be no absolute necessity for bringing every 
gun into action at the first stage of the attack. This period might be 
profitably utilised in considering and deciding upon the positions which 
the artillery must occupy at the decisive stage, and the method of 
bringing the different batteries up to these positions. Whilst the 
enemy is being engaged by the artillery of the advanced guard, and of 
the nearest infantry divisions, the batteries of the corps artillery, which 
remain in the hand of the commander of the corps, and all the rest of 
the artillery, should be manoeuvred into such positions, out of sight of 
the enemy, if possible, that, at a given signal, the whole may move 
forward together to the decisive stage in the shortest possible time, 
and bring a converging or flanking fire to bear upon those points which 
offer the greatest prospect of success to the infantry attack. Or again, 
the whole of the horse artillery with the cavalry might be sent forward 
in the preliminary stage to search out the enemy’s position, and to occupy 
him, whilst the heavy batteries were taking up positions, previous to 
advancing to the decisive stage. To concentrate the whole of the 
artillery upon the guns of the advanced guard in the preliminary stage 
"* (£ The German Artillery.Hoffbauer. 
