32 6 
ROLE OF HORSE ARTILLERY. 
simultaneously, and on as broad a front as possible. Whenever an 
artillery commander has established a number of guns in a position, 
within the effective range of the infantry fire of the enemy, without 
suffering great loss, he has gained an advantage, both moral and 
material, which cannot fail to produce some effect upon the operation 
in which he is engaged. This is a fact the importance of which it is 
difficult to exaggerate. Artillery frequently suffers the greatest loss 
when limbered up and out of action. Too great stress, therefore, 
cannot be given to the necessity of devoting time and study to the art 
, of leading a large force of guns into action when under the effective 
fire of an enemy in position. 
In defence 
of a position 
(c) In defence of a position. The horse artillery will have many oppor¬ 
tunities, during the defence of a position, of acting in a special manner. 
When the enemy is approaching the outposts of the position the horse 
artillery batteries, with the cavalry, should be sent to the front to compel 
him to deploy as far as possible from the defender, and to discover his 
strength and dispositions. Eventually this force will be compelled to re¬ 
tire and to seek shelter in the main position. It would be desirable as a 
rule not to post the horse artillery batteries in the line of defence, but to 
keep them in central positions, and await the development of the 
enemy’s attack, so that they can be despatched at a moment’s notice 
to any part of the line which may require support. When an enemy 
attacks a position along the whole front, as well as in flank, he 
generally finds one or more weak points into which, if he succeeds 
in penetrating, the position must eventually be abandoned. To the 
support of these points the horse’ artillery batteries must be directed, 
and they will be most likely to hold the enemy in check by acting 
offensively and advancing against the flanks of his attack. The neces¬ 
sity for having some batteries in hand for such emergencies can hardly 
admit of a doubt. It will avail little to the defensive to have all its 
artillery in action in well-chosen positions, and to keep the enemy in 
check along the whole line, if there be but one point into which he suc¬ 
ceeds in forcing his way;—in fact, one great advantage of the initiative 
consists in this, that an assailant repulsed at twenty points, and successful 
at one, is probably successful on the whole. The moral pointed to by 
this fact, as far at least as the artillery is concerned, is, not that it is 
necessary to have a large reserve of guns massed in a central position, 
but that a few mobile batteries should be kept in hand at the critical 
stages of the attack, so disposed that any part of the line may be 
reinforced on the shortest notice. When the assailant is about to 
execute a flank attack, the cavalry scouts should be able to give notice 
of the march of his columns towards the threatened flank, and the horse 
artillery and cavalry should be launched against them, and should 
endeavour to hinder their movements. If the French cavalry and 
horse artillery, at the battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat, had attacked the 
Saxon army corps when it was making its flank inarch to the attack of 
Koncourt and St. Privat, and had impeded its progress for but one 
hour, the result of the battle must have been different. This shows 
