370 
THE BLOCKADE OE PLEVNA. 
From the arrival of the Guard Corps before Plevna, and the occupa¬ 
tion by them of Gorni Dubnik on the Sofia road on the 12th October, 
may be dated the complete blockade of Plevna. The communications of 
Osman Pasha were then finally cut, and from that time there remained 
to his army one of two courses—to cut its way out through the lines of 
the investing army, or to lay down its arms when all the reserves of 
provisions were exhausted. 
The duration of the resistance of the Turkish army in Plevna, and 
therefore of the investment, were closely connected with the question 
of food. To determine the precise quantity of provisions which the 
army of Osman Pasha had with it was difficult enough; but by calcula¬ 
tions, and from our own knowledge, we were enabled to arrive at the 
conclusion that the supplies of the Turkish army in Plevna were not 
sufficient for more than two months. 
Having made all arrangements for the capture of Plevna, and the 
taking prisoner of the Turkish army by a system of investment, there 
remained only to follow inflexibly an uniform plan of action : to 
sedulously abstain from all partial attempts at a storm—which could 
not lead to any decisive result, and only augmented our losses unneces¬ 
sarily—and all the time to press forward the investment line as much 
as possible; taking, however, all necessary measures for the reception 
of the enemy should he attempt to cut his way through any part of our 
lines. 
With this view there was ordered: the strengthening of all the 
positions of the investing army by lodgments, trenches, batteries, and 
in the more important points by lunettes and redoubts; the concentra¬ 
tion of the artillery fire against the enemy's works; and the gradual 
approach of the trenches and lodgments to such a distance from the 
enemy's works as to draw off as much as possible of his rifle fire from 
our batteries. Next in importance came the construction of convenient 
roads throughout the position, and the erection of sign-posts on them 
for the movements of the troops in the investment line, the building of 
bridges, and the establishment of telegraphic communication round all 
the investment positions; in short, all measures were taken to meet 
the enemy, in case of an attempt to break through, if possible with the 
greater part of the army, by a timely concentration on the point chosen 
by him for the attack. This chain of fortified positions round Plevna, 
with a front of 70 versts, was divided into six sectors, for the defence 
of each of which a portion of the army was told off,^ corresponding in 
strength to the relative importance of each. There were marked out for 
all the commanders of sectors the possible cases of a sortie, and the 
proportionate concentration of troops on the menaced point. Besides 
that, a few days before the actual advance of the army of Osman Pasha 
into the field, I conducted a manoeuvre in the sectors entrusted to 
Generals Ganetski and Katalei, for the exact calculation of the time 
necessary for the concentration of the forces, in the supposition of a 
^ See Notes 1 and 2, 
