RUSSIAN ARTILLERY TACTICS. 
381 
were trained to follow in time of peace^ and so were able to carry into 
practice in war ; and when we find the Russian artillerymen syste¬ 
matically disregarding these laws or principles of tactics, we ought not 
to be surprised if we find that they failed to secure the same results 
which the German artillerymen did when they acted in obedience to 
these laws or principles. 
What are these principles of offensive artillery tactics ? They may 
be broadly stated as follows '* * * § 
1st Laic .—A powerful artillery fire must be developed as early as 
possible in the action.f 
The object of this preparatory artillery fire, which should be as pre¬ 
ponderating as possible, is twofold—to silence the enemy^s artillery 
fire, and to demoralise the enemy^s infantry, and so prepare the way for 
the attack. To secure this object, ( a ) the greater proportion of the 
artillery must be kept well to the front in the columns of route; J 
( b ) guns must be massed when deployed, to secure unity of command and 
concentration of fire.§ 
Rive ele¬ 
mentary- 
laws or 
principles 
of modern 
artillery 
tactics. 
2nd Law .—It is the duty of the artillery not only to prepare the way 
for the infantry, but to assist the infantry in its attack. || 
3rd Law .—There must be no waste of ammunition at long ranges; 
guns must be moved as soon as possible to decisive range. 
* These principles, deduced from the experience of the war of 1870-1 and from the writings of 
all the recognised authorities on tactics, must form the basis of any system of artillery tactics for 
modern field artillery. The authorities from which they are derived are the following:— 
“Proceedings, R.A. Institution,” No. 5, Vol. VIII. 
“Notes on Artillery in the Field,” by Lt.-Col. W. J. Williams, C.B., published 
in “Proceedings, R.A. Institution,” No. 2, Vol. IX. 
“ R.A. Institution Prize Essay for 1876,” by Col. H. A. Smyth, R.A. 
“ German Official Account of the War of 1870-1.” 
Hoffbauer, May, Boguslawski, and other writers. 
+ “ A preparatory fire,” says Capt. May, “of small-arms against the defenders who are under 
cover will never have the effect of rendering a storm possible. According to the most simple calcu¬ 
lation, the storming party, however strong its columns, will be repulsed, always supposing the 
position to be held by brave troops. Rut nothing can withstand a powerful preparatory attack by 
artillery ; if the element to be broken be the infantry, it can only be done by this means .”—Tactical 
Retrospect. 
X “At all parts of the extensive battle-field the whole strength of the batteries was from the first 
brought into play. Inserting themselves in the columns of route in a position favourable to early 
deployment, they hastened forward to the battle-field with the advanced parties of the infantry.” 
German Official Account of the War of1870-1. 
§ “ It is, I believe, to the massing of guns, and their consequent unity of action, that the Prussians 
owed their great artillery success in the campaign of 1870 .”—Extract from a lecture delivered 
before H.R.E. the JDulce of Connaught, at the TJ.S. Institution, by Lt.-Col. E. PracTcenbury, R.A 
|| On this point Colonel H. A. Smyth, R.A., says “By the time that the skirmishing front of 
the infantry attack comes under the aimed musketry fire of the defence, as much of the artillery of 
the attack as the ground will allow must be already in its last and decisive positions, bearing 
directly on the actual point determined for the delivery of the assault, and on the collateral lines • 
enfilading where it is possible, regardless of losses, straining every nerve (at such short range that 
none of its efforts will be wasted) to overwhelm with its fire, to disorganise and quell the defenders 
—daring everything in the intention of bearing the infantry through the last arduous crisis, and of 
thus securing the success of the whole.”— R.A. Institution Prize Essay, 1876. 
