882 
RUSSIAN ARTILLERY TACTICS. 
It should always be remembered that the moral and material effect of 
artillery fire increases as the range diminishes.* Great losses of men 
and horses will be unavoidable if great results are looked for, 
4th Law ,—Guns are no longer to be regarded as colours; they must 
be fought to the last, even at the risk of being lost.fi 
5th Law .—Guns have nothing to fear from a front attack of infantry ^ 
provided their flanks are secured.fi 
These laws 
were in¬ 
variably 
disregarded 
by the Rus¬ 
sian com¬ 
manders in 
the first 
part of the 
war. 
A careful study of the battles of the late war will show that, with the 
exception, perhaps, of the attack on Nikopolis on the 15th of July, 1877, 
the above-mentioned laws of artillery tactics during the greater part 
of the campaigns, both in Europe and in Asia, were invariably disre¬ 
garded by the Russian commanders, who worked on an old and obsolete 
system • and it was not till towards the close of the campaign that they 
recognised their errors and modified their tactics accordingly. And as 
they suffered grievous losses at first by the feeble use they made of 
their artillery, so they won great successes in the end when they learnt 
how the full tactical power of the arm can be developed by right 
employment, The victory of the Aladja-Dagh goes far to rival that of 
^ This is a most important point, and cannot be too strongly insisted on. As has recently been 
pointed out by Col. C. B. Brackenbury, an experiment made at Okehampton shows that the actual 
destructive effect of artillery fire increased steadily from 18 per cent, per minute killed at 1000 yds. 
to 75 per cent, at 100 yds., and this though the number of gunners was diminished to represent 
losses from the fire of the infantry. Again, Major S. J. Nicholson, R.H.A., who has given great 
attention to this question, writes very strongly to the same effect, and as the Russian artillery will 
meet with, severe criticism later on for opening fire and remaining in action at long ranges, it is 
well to have the opinion of so high an authority distinctly recorded. He writes as follows:—-“The 
great loss of power, and consequently of effect, which shrapnel suffer from increase of range, is so 
great that the responsibility of the officer who uses them at distant objects must be considerable. 
In any of the cases above stated, opening fire early may be absolutely necessary ; the only responsi¬ 
bility remaining will then be that it is not continued one moment too long. If, however, there is 
no such absolute necessity, surely some very sufficient reasons should be demanded from an officer 
who, in the earlier and comparatively unimportant period of an engagement, when the effect pro¬ 
duced could, from the length of the range, at best be but small, should expend ammunition which, 
later on would be capable of exerting the enormous power that shrapnel at ordinary and short 
ranges has been shown to possess, and which, might, if reserved for really critical periods, exercise 
a deciding influence on the fortunes of the day.”— Proceedings, P.A. Institution, No. 2, Vol. X. 
f <£ A battery which has maintained a destructive fire at a decisive point for five minutes—one 
minute even'—and then is lost, has done more for the general good than 10 batteries which from 
well chosen positions in the rear have kept up a well-aimed, but, after all, a nearly ineffective fire.” 
—Per Kamjpf urn Plevna, by Capt. Von Trotha. 
Though the losses in men and horses during the Franco-German war were enormous, the loss of 
guns was insignificantly small. At Gravelotte two guns were lost, and two were rendered 
unserviceable. At Sedan one gun burst. At Worth, Borny, and Mars-la-Tour, although the 
German commanders used their artillery boldly, if not recklessly, they did not lose a single gun. 
+ This is an old maxim of Napoleon’s. The experience of the Franco-German war does not lead 
us to believe that it is modified by the introduction of breech-loading small-arms. Hoffbauer quotes 
many instances of German batteries compelling Freilch skirmishers to retire before then.’ fire alone. 
Colonel C. B. Brackenbury, E.A., also lays down the principle that “ whether acting offensively or 
defensively, artillery can protect its own front in ordinary open country, and should not retire before 
infantry unless the whole force is retreating.”— Journal of the U.S. Institution, No. 86, Vol. XX. 
