RUSSIAN ARTILLERY TACTICS. 
383 
Sedan as an instance of the “ grand and decisive '' results that can be 
obtained by a commander who knows how to use his artillery boldly and 
fearlessly in action. 
It is time now to pass from allegation to fact. The battle of Zewin, 
in Asia, fought on the 25th of June, 1877, may be taken as a type of 
all the. early battles of the war, and will serve as well as any other to 
illustrate the faulty tactics of the Russian artillery. 
General Loris-Melikoff, advancing from Kars with 16 battalions of 
infantry, 52 guns, and some cavalry, found Mukhtar Pasha strongly 
entrenched in a position on his right flank above the village of Zewin. 
The Turkish force was 24 battalions of infantry and 2 batteries of 
artillery. Independently of the entrenchments, the position was one of 
great natural strength, and, although the Turkish commander had only 
12 guns at his disposal, he had skilfully placed them so that they could 
sweep all the approaches with a powerful cross-fire. The main Turkish 
position was on a terrace in front of a high mountain, and owing to the 
configuration of the ground it could not be turned, but would have to 
be captured by a front attack. How did the Russian General 
proceed to attack ? If ever there was a position which demanded 
a thorough artillery preparation before it was assailed by infantry 
it was that of Zewin. Did he, therefore, knowing how weak the 
Turks were in artillery, mass his guns in one large battery, and 
endeavour to crush the enemy's artillery with an overwhelming and 
concentrated fire ? Did he then advance his batteries—the Turkish 
artillery being silenced—and at close and decisive range pour in a 
demoralising fire upon the Turkish infantry, and so render the position 
untenable before his own troops attempted to storm it ? He did 
nothing of the kind. He began by dispersing his guns all over the 
field of battle. Dividing his attacking force into three main columns, 
he sent three batteries with the right column, one battery with the 
centre, and another battery with the left; while his two Cossack horse 
artillery batteries, which might have proved of the utmost value to him 
during the action, were sent with the cavalry to execute a long flank 
march to the southward, which some said would be four miles, others 
seven, but which eventually turned out to be 20 miles in length. 
These two batteries, in fact, took no part in the action whatever. What 
was the consequence of these dispositions ? The batteries had instruc¬ 
tions to act independently. There was no attempt at unity of command 
or concentration of fire. At long and impossible ranges, varying 
between two and three miles, they came into action, “ one after the 
other/' firing when and where they could. The Russian gunners, we 
are told, found some difficulty in hitting off the range of the Turkish 
batteries; which is not surprising when we learn the distance at which 
they opened fire. 4000 yds. is considered to be the extreme effective 
range of shrapnel shell fired from field guns against troops in the open, 
the atmosphere being clear, and the other conditions of firing favour¬ 
able.* Here we have the Russian guns not only opening fire but 
* “ Report on tlie Artillery Experiments at Okehampton, 5 ’ p. 14. Major Nicholson, K.II.A*, 
in his paper on <£ Shrapnel Fire,” lays down 3500 yds. as a maximum range. 
The battle 
of Zewin, 
fought on 
the 25th of 
June, 1877. 
