384 
RUSSIAN ARTILLERY TACTICS. 
General 
Kriidenei's 
attack on 
Nikopolis, 
15th of 
July, 1877* 
remaining in action for several hours at ranges varying between 4000 
and 5000 yds., against troops which were strongly entrenched. So 
little effect had this desultory fire on the Turkish batteries, that for a 
long time they did not even reply. Their obstinate silence, indeed, led 
the Russians at one time to imagine that the Turks had abandoned 
the position. The Turkish gunners were in reality reserving their fire 
until the Russians came within effective range of their guns. Mean¬ 
while, although the Turkish artillery was in no respect overpowered, 
the Russian infantry were ordered to attack; and against a position 
which was—as we are told—literally “ seamed ” with entrenchments 
did Hermann* hurl his battalions. The troops were met with a cross¬ 
fire of both artillery and infantry, the effect of which is thus described 
by an eye-witness who was on the Russian side during the battle :—• 
“ Our men,” he writes, “ descended to the ravine below, and then 
passed to the assault of the great hill with the main Turkish battery. 
There they again fell under a frightful cross-fire which the pen fails to 
describe. Single shots were rarely heard; the bullets flew thick, as if 
whole regiments were pouring in volleys upon us. The Turks, as we 
afterwards learnt, had brought up mitrailleuses. The result of this 
murderous fire could not be seen until the 14th showed themselves 
above the level of the first hill.This attack was speedily 
beaten off; it was f Thus far and no farther V Three separate attempts 
did they make to get forward, but all in vain, and the losses were 
immense. To fill the cup of misfortune, during the third attack one of 
the shells from our batteries fell among the first line of stormers, and 
killed several of our men.” And this is the only allusion made by this 
eye-witness to the artillery throughout the action. It does not, indeed, 
appear that a single battery was advanced to support the infantry 
attack. In place of boldly pushing on, as the Prussian batteries did 
at Gravelotte and Sedan, side by side with the infantry, and pouring in 
a hot fire of shrapnel—the effect of which is practically annihilating at 
short and decisive ranges—the Russian guns seem to have remained 
stationary during the whole of the battle, doing little or nothing to 
divert either the enemy^s artillery or infantry fire, which was con¬ 
centrated with “ terrible effect ” on the Russian columns. 
On only one occasion during the early part of the campaign was the 
Russian artillery well handled—viz., during the attack on Nikopolis. 
Finding the Turks, as usual, strongly entrenched in a position which is 
described as being well selected and made the most of, General 
Kriidener, the commander of the 9th Corps, brought up no less than 
48 guns, the superior fire of which silenced the Turkish batteries in a 
few hours. Not till this was effectually done did Kriidener order the 
infantry to advance, which they then did—the Russian guns advancing 
with them, and taking up fresh positions close to the enemy. We find 
the artillery rendering most important aid to the infantry all through 
this action. Thus, “ General Schildner-Schoulder received orders to 
carry the Osma bridge, which, however, he was not successful in doing 
* This General appears to have been in executive command during the day. 
