400 
THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY. 
B. Left Bank, or West Front. 
I. —Inner Line . 
6. Tschim Lunette; a work without a ditch, 900 metres N.E. of 
No. 5. Close to the south of the Temur Pasha suburb, on a rock, at the 
foot of which the river takes a beud to the east, and which commands 
the upper valley. 
7. Fort Yeli Pasha, 900 metres W. of the citadel, 1226 metres 
N.W. of No. 6 on the southern Tschakmak Hill. Irregular closed 
bastioned work. Ditch 6’3 metres broad, 2 deep, with defensible 
barrack. 200 metres crest. 
8. ’ Inglis Tabia, 1706 metres N. of No. 7. Lunette with ditches 
like No. 7, only for infantry. 
II. —-Outer Line. 
9. Fort Techmas, 2000 metres W. of No. 6, on a spur of the 
Tchorak Hills, to command the Erzeroum road. An irregular closed 
bastioned fort, with 474 metres of crest. 
10. Fort Tikh Tepessi, 533 metres W. of No. 9, in a commanding 
position on the S.W. spur of the Tchorak Hills, commanding the Olti 
road. A four-sided bastioned redoubt, with ditches 2 # 5 metres broad 
and 2 deep. N.W. of it is the advanced Ai Tabia redoubt. Together, 
they have a crest line of 316 metres. 
11. Laz Tepessi or Tschackmach batteries, on the most command¬ 
ing position of the whole north front, 1200 metres N. of No. 10, 2000 
N.W. of No. 7. Three batteries close to one another, with retired 
flanks, and respectively 81, 72, and 81 metres of crest line. In front 
of them is a covered way for infantry with 71 metres crest line. 
12. Muchlis Tabia, for the same purpose as No. 1, 1100 metres 
west of it and 1130 metres N. of No. 8. An advanced lunette with 
290 metres of crest. 200 metres N.W. of it, the small Kottuk redoubt. 
The armament consisted of 100 rifled guns, mostly muzzle-loaders, 
and 54 smooth-bores. The strength of the garrison necessary for such 
a fortress, whose outer line had a circumference of 16 kils., should be 
at least 25,000 men, which, however, at this time were not there. There 
was only bomb-proof cover for 3000 men, and bomb-proof magazines 
for supplies for four weeks. The strength of the forts lay in their 
excellent positions, but their construction showed, almost invariably, 
weak points. An assailant would find in the rocky soil scarcely a 
single place fit for the opening of approaches or batteries, so that all 
kinds of siege works have to be undertaken under great disadvantages. 
General Komaroff began his reconnaissances on the 13th May by 
a demonstration against Fort Arab, with 1 battalion, 4 sotnias, and 
1^ batteries, in which the troops captured without loss a large number 
