THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY. 
403 
ground gave exceptional advantages for fortifying the camp, and for 
the placing under cover of strong reserves, which, though concealed, 
were close to the fighting line. The steep and deeply cut valley of 
the Khani Tchai, which falls into the Zewin Tchai, divided the isolated 
but commanding position of the right wing from the main position. 
This was rendered almost impregnable by the formation of the ground, 
and on it were posted two mountain batteries which completely com¬ 
manded the ground in front and on the flanks. The centre was 
strengthened by a redoubt and a battery, which last was also intended 
to sweep the main road. The left flank was the weakest, but was still 
quite defensible, and was commanded by the central position, and its 
flank was covered by a river which was absolutely impassable. 
On the opposite (left) bank, the reverse slope of a ridge permitted 
the Russian columns to concentrate unmolested, and through its deeply- 
cleft valleys infantry could debouch on to the river Zewin, ford it, and 
then reach the first steep slopes of the enemy's position quite unob¬ 
served up to a certain point. It was almost impossible to take artillery 
over to the right bank ; it could, however, support the attack from 
the ridge on the left - bank, being on the same level as the Turkish 
batteries, and 3600 metres from them. 
General Heimann, acting under orders from General Loris-Melikoff:, 
ordered the troops to be under arms at 3.30 a.m. on the 25th June, 
except 5 companies, 1 sotnia, 1 battery, and 3 sapper companies, who 
were to remain as baggage guard in the camp of Mezingerd on the 
Mellidooz brook, and advance towards the above-mentioned rendezvous, 
which was reached at 9 a.m. by the cavalry, and 12 noon by the in¬ 
fantry. The cavalry had first to drive the enemy's weak outposts over 
to the right bank. After the infantry had had a rest of two hours, 
Heimann formed his troops for the attack as follows :—» 
Left "Flank Detachment. 
Major-General Prince 
Tchavtchavatze. 
16th and 17th Dragoons. 
1st and 2nd Volga Cossacks. 
Tschetschna and Alexandropol 
Cavalry Regiments. 
Gurian Legion. 
Kuban and Terek Batteries. 
26 sotnias, 2 batteries. 
Left Wing. 
Major-General Cederholm. 
16th Grenadiers. 
4th Battery. 
1st and 2nd Daghestan Cavalry 
Regiments. 
4 battalions, 8 sotnias, 1 batt. 
Infantry to attack enemy’s 
right; cavalry to keep up 
connection with left flanking 
detachment. 
Centre. 
Major-General Komaroff. 
14th Grenadiers (except five 
companies). 
15th Grenadiers. 
6th Battery. 
6f battalions, 1 battery. 
To attack enemy’s centre. 
Fight Wing. 
Major-General Avinoff. 
13th Grenadiers. 
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries. 
4 battalions, 3 9-pr. batteries. 
Remain on left bank, shell the 
centre of the enemy’s posi¬ 
tion, and support the attack 
of the centre column. In¬ 
fantry to cover artillery. 
Fight Flank Detachment. 
Kisliaro-Greben Cossacks. 
3 sotnias. 
To cover the right flank. 
Prince Tchavtchavatze was to turn the Turkish right by a road 
32 kils. long and threaten their line of retreat; also to keep a look out 
