433 
NOTES ON THE 
ORGANISATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OR 
SIEGE ARTILLERY, 
BY 
CAPT. R. WALKEY, R.A. 
IN STRUCT OB OR ARIIIAEBY, E.ft{,A. 
These notes are intended to supplement those on the same subject in the 
“ Handbook for Yield Service,” 1878, In compiling them, the author has made 
• free use of the following ivorks :— 
“Composition and Strength of a Siege Train required for the Attack of a Modern Fortress,” 
by Major Kemmis, R.A. (R.A. Institution Prize Essay, 1877.) 
“Attack of Fortresses.” Capt. Fraser, R.E. (R.E. Prize Essay, 1876.) 
“ Experiments in Breaching, at Graudenz,” by Capt. Fraser, R.E. (R.E. Professional Papers.) 
And “Notes of Sieges,” by Kraft, Prince of Hohenlohe Ingelfingen—General Von Decker-—* 
and Count Bylandfc Rheidt, of the Austrian service. 
CHAPTER I. 
Altered Conditions of Attack.—First and Second Artillery Positions.—Purposes for which Ordnance 
are required.—Composition of British Siege Train.—Breaching by Cannelure Cutting with 
Direct and Indirect Fire.—Practical Directions for Breaching.—Breaching by Demolition.—• 
Necessary Striking Velocity.—Limit of Oblique Fire.—Practical Indications of Progress of 
Breach.—Notes on Artillery Fire. 1 — Ammunition: Principle of Supply.—Rate of Artillery 
Fire.—Night Firing.—Per centage of Projectiles for British Train.— Carriages for Travelling 
and Firing.—Variety of Carriages,—Protection for Detachments.—Charge of Siege Train,—Site 
of Field Arsenal. 
The great power and precision of rifled small-arms and guns, 
together with the destructive effect of shrapnel on lines of skirmishers, 
has modified considerably the course adopted when occupying the 
ground in the vicinity of a fortress. 
Supported by the artillery of the place, the skirmishers of the 
besieged ought to be able to hold their ground during the day at least 
1000 yds. to the front, they would probably cover themselves by rifle 
pits, shelter trenches, &c. The besiegers would have to drive in these 
skirmishers before their working parties could commence breaking 
ground, and their outposts would necessarily be at such a distance as 
not to be exposed to the artillery fire from the place. 
Altered 
conditions 
of attack, 
owing to 
increase of 
range and 
accuracy of 
rifled ord- ' 
nance. 
56 
