470 THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY (PART II.) 
centre in front of Avlijar at Bulanak, surprised it, and returned into 
camp with trifling loss. 
In the hope of driving back the Russian right wing by an over¬ 
whelming attack, Mukhtar advanced on both roads against the 
Kuruk Dara and Karajal positions on the 25th August—in fact, ran his 
head against the strongest part of the Russian line. After twelve 
hours' hard fighting the attack was repulsed. The Russian loss was a 
good deal over 1000 men, while that of the Turks is said to have been 
only 1200. At any rate the result of the day's fighting, the details of 
which are not completely known, was that Mukhtar seized and held 
the strong advanced position of the Kizil Tepe, which was only about 
4 kils. from the Russian outpost line, and therefore unpleasantly near ; 
his main body remained at Subotan and Hadji Yali, but the positions 
of his right and left wings remained unchanged. On the 26th August, 
therefore, he occupied a wedge-like position, the point of which was 
strongly held. 
The entire month of September passed away without any noteworthy 
occurrences. Mukhtar remained almost totally inactive in his posi¬ 
tions, in the expectation that Ismail Pasha would be able to push up 
the left bank of the Arpa Tchai, by Kulpi, and then begin a concerted 
attack on the Russian positions. On the 6th and 13th September 
Loris-Melikoff made two minor reconnaissances, the last against the 
extreme left of the Turkish army, without learning anything by them 
except that Mukhtar had made no change in his dispositions. 
By the 26th September the last reinforcements had entered the 
Russian camp, and as the approaching winter would soon make opera¬ 
tions very difficult, Loris-Melikoff began his preparations for an 
energetic offensive, the supreme direction of which was in the hands of 
the Grand Duke Michael. Mukhtar's line, the separate positions of 
which were immensely strong, had, however, one weak point, and it 
was that since the occupation of the Kizil Tepe he had two fronts to 
occupy—one facing north, the left of which rested on the Little Yagni, 
the other fronting east, with its right in Megaspert, while the inner 
flanks of both rested on the Kizil Tepe. The length of each front was 
about 20 kils. If one of those fronts were attacked and the Russians 
succeeded in driving in the outer wing, the Turkish reserves, placed 
behind both faces, and the common line of retreat would be en¬ 
dangered. 
The Russians decided to attack Mukhtar's north front, as the 
approach to the other was very difficult; but a turning movement on 
the Turkish left could not be performed because it was covered by the 
fortress of Kars, which was only 15 kils. off. They were therefore 
compelled to direct the main attack on the inner part of the Turkish 
left and the positions near it, while a demonstration was to be made 
before the right wing and the east front, to draw off the Turkish 
reserves. On these general principles the attack of the 2nd October 
was arranged. The extreme right wing, under General Roop, failed* 
after repeated attacks, to take the Little Yagni, as 13 battalions had 
arrived from Kars to join in its defence, while General Scheremetieff 
succeeded after two hours' fighting in taking and holding the Great 
