506 
GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1879 . 
Causes of 
change of 
relative 
power. 
What we 
must do to 
remedy this 
state of 
things. 
Opportu¬ 
nity for 
effective ar¬ 
tillery fire 
not fre» 
quent. 
must be present, to perform its work effectually, in sufficient force to 
hold in check, if not altogether to subdue, the enemy's artillery. The 
necessity, then, for its existence has in no way diminished. 
3. Let us now examine the causes which have led to infantry fire 
having been developed to such an extent as to have reversed the 
relative power of the two arms at close range. In former times, 
infantry fire was certainly not effective at more than 300 yds. At this 
range the case fire of the S.B. gun was most deadly, and could 
certainly overwhelm the fire of the infantry. Now, infantry fire 
begins to be effective at 800 yds., and can be felt much further. Case 
fire of rifled guns, up to the present time, has certainly been less 
effective than that of the smooth-bores which preceded them, and at 
800 yds. the fire of segment from an Armstrong 12-pr. (service B.L.), 
or even shrapnel from a 9-pr. R.M.L., cannot compete with S.B. case 
at the ranges at which it was used. Thus, then, the range of infantry 
fire has greatly increased, while that of artillery's most destructive 
projectile has rather diminished. We speak, of course, of guns 
actually in our service, and not of any which may be introduced 
hereafter. This loss of efficiency of case fire is due to two causes, viz. 
—(1) The very low proportionate charges fired by rifled guns, as 
compared with smooth-bores. This is fatal to good case, which 
requires a high muzzle velocity. (2) A considerable proportion of the 
weight of the projectile is taken up by segmental linings, &c., to 
prevent a spin being given by the rifling, which would cause the 
bullets to scatter so much as to seriously impair the effect. The 
capacity for bullets is thus much reduced. In “ Treatise on Ammu¬ 
nition," 1874, p. 126, we see that in some instances nearly half the 
total weight is thus lost. In old S.B. case the envelope generally 
weighed from to of the whole. 
Again, infantry fire has increased enormously in rapidity and ease of 
fire; also—what is perhaps of more importance-—modern rifles can be 
loaded by a man lying down, thus exposing a very small mark to fire 
at. Moreover, the increased range of rifle fire gives the infantryman 
a much greater chance of obtaining cover, and thus of protecting 
himself from the artillery. On the other hand, the fire of artillery's 
most deadly weapon at ordinary ranges—the shrapnel—is much slower 
than was the case fire of S.B. guns. The long time taken to bore and 
fix a time fuze of the present pattern (which sort of fuze gives better 
results than percussion), materially weakens artillery fire at decisive 
moments. 
4. The problem, then, to be solved, in order to re-establish the 
preponderance of artillery fire at close ranges, may be stated thus 
Case fire to be much more destructive than formerly; shrapnel fire at 
600 to 800 yds. to be as destructive against modern formations as was 
S.B. case against a line 2-deep at 300 to 400 yds. 
5. With regard to Colonel Hamley's second argument—viz., that 
the opportunities of effective artillery have decreased—the state of 
affairs is not so adverse to the gun as might be thought at first. 
True, the targets exposed are not so inviting, but the range during 
