GOLD MEDAL PEIZE ESSAY, 1879 . 
507 
which bodies of hostile troops must move more or less exposed to fire 
has increased enormously; also, we are now furnished with a very 
deadly projectile—shrapnel or kindred shells—at all ranges; whereas, 
in former times, the moment case fire ceased to be available, solid 
shot, whose effect was chiefly moral, had to be employed. It is true 
that occasionally use was made of shrapnel from S.B. guns; but the 
great loss of velocity from retardation and the irregular effect of the 
bursting charge, together with the imperfection of the fuzes used, 
prevented the general introduction of this nature of projectile. 
We think there are few who would not prefer to be fired at in line 
by a battery of S.B. guns firing solid shot at 600 yds., to moving in 
modern attack formation under the shrapnel fire of guns of the latest 
pattern at 1300 yds. 
6. Again, there is no doubt that hitherto the effects produced by Ming off 
rifled artillery on the field of battle have not come up to what might action com. 
have been expected from its performances on the practice ground, ^ace prac- 
The same may be said of small-arms. If infantry could shoot as well tice. 
in action as at practice, one battalion would probably be at least as 
effective as ten are now; common causes leading to a common falling 
off in the effects of both arms in action, compared with peace per¬ 
formances. Colonel Hamley has omitted this consideration from the 
comparison between them. 
7. But we think that we shall see, as we go on, that many of the 
causes producing bad practice in action may be eliminated or reduced in 
magnitude, in the case of the artillery, whereas it appears to be well 
nigh impossible to effect much further improvement in infantry fire 
beyond what may be effected by better training of the men. This 
dictum, however, cannot be considered as final, but only true as far 
as our present knowledge extends. 
Probable 
that more 
maybe done 
for artillery 
than infan¬ 
try in the 
way of 
getting 
better com¬ 
parative 
effect in ac¬ 
tion. 
8. We may say, then, that the causes which have led to the causes of 
generally indifferent performances of rifled guns on the field of battle, fiance of 
compared with effects obtained in peace time, are— 
artillery in 
action. 
(1) Bad handling, or false tactics. 
(2) Want of skill and acquaintance with their weapon on the part 
of officers and men fighting it. 
(3) Want of power on the part of the gun itself, and want of the 
necessary appliances for developing whatever power existed 
—such as range-finders, &c. 
It is with regard to this last point that we propose to speak. The 
consideration of it leads us back at once to the point whence we 
started—viz., that the comparative power of artillery has declined. 
Want of power in the individual gun has been the chief cause of this 
change. Infantry fire has improved in effect far more than artillery; 
but the power of the individual man limits the development of the 
small-arm. As far as we can see at present, a limit has been reached 
in the case of the Martini-Henry; witness the great complaints made, 
