ORGANISATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF SIEGE ARTILLERY. 
587 
As a convenient organisation, it is suggested by Prussian autho¬ 
rities to assign to a company (200 strong) for permanent charge 
either 15 cm batteries of 6 guns, 12 cm batteries of 8 guns, 21 cm batteries 
of 4 guns, or two 9 cm batteries of 6 guns. By this arrangement each 
battery, or, if desirable, any subdivision of a battery— i.e., one gun— 
is treated as the unit. It is worthy of consideration whether such 
an organisation may not be preferable to that adopted in our service. - * 
It must be borne in mind that the distances of the various depots 
from the field arsenal will materially affect the labour demanded of the 
artillery. The duty of feeding the trench depots from the intermediate 
ones, and these latter from the field arsenal, will fall mainly on them. 
No doubt in many cases the field artillery would be able to render 
assistance by their horses, but such help could not be continuously 
relied on, and if no tramway be laid, the labour of transporting 
ordnance and ammunition will be very considerable, varying with 
the state of the roads and weather. At best, however, bringing up 
powder, loading and unloading shells from carts, together with their 
storage, is heavy work, and it has now become increased by the 
greater weight of each projectile and powder charge. 
The foregoing points must be duly considered and allowed for when 
estimating the number of men necessary to render any particular siege 
train thoroughly efficient. 
As the circumstances affecting transport will vary with every fortress 
attacked, it would appear desirable to form a “ siege transport train,” 
in addition to, and distinct from the war establishment of troops to 
serve the ordnance. An organisation of this kind would simplify the 
calculation for each siege undertaken, relieve the detachments of many 
onerous duties, and probably prove itself more efficient by the men 
becoming better acquainted with their special duties. 
Such a train was suggested after the Crimean campaign,t when 
great difficulties were encountered by us in the conveyance of stores, 
and has been organised by the Germans since their last war. 
After the experience of 1866 the importance of fortress warfare was 
not fully recognised by the Germans, so that when called upon at 
once, in 1870, to despatch 288 pieces of ordnance to Strasbourg (the 
complete siege train prepared for service), and soon after to reinforce 
Prussian 
organisa¬ 
tion for 
siege train. 
Duties of 
artillery 
affected by 
the position 
of the 
various 
depots. 
Expediency 
of forming 
a “siege 
transport 
train.” 
Experi¬ 
ences de¬ 
rived from 
war of 
1870 - 1 . 
this number by 71 guns, whilst trains 
were 
very shortly needed for 
Toul and Metz, the strength and composition of the staff of the siege 
* In regard to this point, General E. Wray, C.B., states (“ Proceedings, R.A. Inst.” Vol. X.) 
“ It is manifest that under this plan (heavy and light siege train units of 30 guns each) any 
change found desirable or necessary in the armaments might at the last moment disarrange the 
whole train; whereas, by treating each gun as a unit, and keeping a proportion of each nature in 
reserve, complete in every respect, a siege train of any size and form required could, by a mere 
multiplication of units, be prepared in a few days, its establishment of men, horses, artificers, and 
stores calculated, and the weight of every load composing it accurately determined.” 
f Gen. Sir J. St. George, K.C.B., reporting on the siege operations before Sebastopol, gives it as his 
opinion that from 60 to 200 horses should be permanently attached to the siege train; and 
Major-General Sir Richard Dacres, K.C.B., strongly advocates the use of wagons and carts 
specially adapted for carrying shot and shell, with frames fitted in them that can be altered 
according to the size required. (“Proceedings, R.A. Institution,” Vol, X. p. 159.) 
69 
