SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1879 . 559 
guns in the present day, it will be necessary to glance at the following 
points:— 
1. The improvements in the infantry weapon of late years. 
2. The increased use of field entrenchments for the defence neces¬ 
sitated by this improvement, and the enhanced value of any 
cover, however slight, owing to the rapid and deadly fire of 
infantry. 
3. The effect of Nos. 1 and 2 on artillery tactics. 
1. It is striking how we may notice in each succeeding war of 
importance a gradual but steadily progressive improvement in the 
infantry weapon. 
The Crimean war introduced for the first time the rifle; the Austro- 
Prussian war of 1866 brought in the breech-loader; the Franco- 
Prussian war gave us the Chassepot—superior to the old class of 
breech-loaders. In the late war in Turkey the Turks were partly 
armed with Peabody-Martinfis, and their cavalry partly with Win¬ 
chester repeating rifles. 
In this gradual progress the leading features are increased range 
and rapidity of fire. Thus both the intensity of fire and the zone of 
danger have been enormously augmented. In Switzerland the 
infantry are now armed with repeating rifles, or magazine guns, as 
they are also called on the Continent. 
In 1877 a Committee was formed in France to experiment with and 
report upon repeating rifles, and experiments have also been carried 
out in Austria and Germany. Austria has at present decided not to 
arm her infantry with repeating rifles, but in Germany it is now under 
consideration. 
The question of long-range infantry fire has attracted attention for 
some years past, and has received still more notice since the Russo- 
Turkish war, especially in Austria, Germany, and Russia, it having 
been greatly employed by the Turks.* 
2. Hand in hand with the increasing range and rapidity of fire of 
the infantry weapon, we find the use of field entrenchments becoming 
more and more common, until they have come to be recognised as an 
important factor of success for an army acting on the defensive. 
In the Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866 field entrenchments were 
conspicuous by their absence. It is true that a few were thrown up by 
the Austrians at Sadowajf but so little was their importance recognised 
that most of them were never occupied, the troops for whom they were 
intended not even knowing of their existence. Had the right flank 
been strongly entrenched, the result might have been very different. 
The villages, even along the front of the position, were not even pro¬ 
perly prepared for defence. { 
* “United Service Journal,” No. 98, of 1878. Paper by Lieut. James, R.E. 
f Prussian Official Account, campaign 1866. 
X Colonel Cooke, E.E. Pamphlet on 1866 j 
