SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1879 . 
561 
The experience of the Prussians in 1866 stood the German artillery 
in good stead in 1870-1. In the former war we find a great want of 
unity of command over artillery masses.*- There was too much inde¬ 
pendence of action, with a corresponding diversity of objects in view 
and want of unity of purpose; concentration of fire on important points 
was consequently seldom attained. In 1870-1 we find a complete con¬ 
trast to this state of things ; large masses of guns were concentrated 
under one command, with one special object in view. We may 
instance— 
Mars-la-Tour, where, late in the day, we find 19 batteries concen¬ 
trated between the Bois de Yionville and the high road. 
Gravebtte , 81 batteries on St. Privat. 
The guns were constantly pushed on to the front into most dangerous 
positions, and were often recklessly—sometimes uselessly—exposed to 
infantry fire. Pleavy losses were not minded so long as the fire of the 
guns was conducive to the success of the general plan. They were, 
moreover, fully alive to the importance of closely supporting their 
infantry in the close attack, after the preliminary stage of preparatory 
fire; and this was often carried out with noble self-sacrifice on the 
part of the artillery. 
The want of this close support to the infantry was on some occasions 
severely felt; their infantry had the greatest confidence in the sister 
arm, and justly. A notable instance of the want of this support, from 
no fault of the artillery, was at Spicheren, where the infantry could 
make no impression until closely supported by guns (on the north 
edge of the plateau)—an operation rendered most difficult, owing to 
the want of artillery positions at close ranges.f 
In turning to the battles round Plevna, we may notice the following 
points, extracted from a most interesting work by Captain Thilo von 
Trotha, entitled “ Der Kampf um Plevna/"’ (“ Tactical Studies ”) :— 
1. The Russian batteries were usually distributed equally along the 
fighting line. There was no keeping in hand a portion of the artillery 
for use as corps artillery. 
2. Eire was opened at long ranges, and almost always frontal. No 
endeavour was made to use oblique or enfilade fire (one instance alone 
is given). 
3. The numerically weaker Turkish artillery soon gave up the 
contest, and withdrew their guns under cover, bringing them up again 
on the advance of the Russian infantry. 
4. The frontal positions of the Russian artillery rendered it ne¬ 
cessary to suspend their fire almost at the commencement of the 
infantry attack. 
5. The cases in which batteries followed up the infantry attack 
and endeavoured to support them were exceptional. The artillery 
generally remained in their first positions, and during the second part 
* Colonel Home, Precis of Modern Tactics, and Prussian Official Account, 1866. 
f Prussian Official Account, 1870-1, 
72 
