562 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 18?0. 
of the attack played quite a secondary part, whilst the Turkish artillery, 
though much weaker, made its effects considerably felt during this 
period. 
Energetic support of infantry is almost only to be found under 
Scobeloff's command. 
The batteries which did advance with the infantry suffered so severely in 
men and horses as to become either totally or in part unserviceable. 
The Russians found few opportunities of firing against uncovered troops; 
all their fire was against infantry behind either natural or artificial 
cover, and was almost entirely ineffective. Notwithstanding hours of 
preparation by the fire of powerful artillery masses, the infantry 
generally advanced to the attack of an unshattered enemy.* 
The use of the Russian artillery, as will be seen from the above, is 
not such as to inspire confidence in that arm, and though in a great 
measure due to want of efficiency, still great stress must be laid on the 
fact that by judicious use of blinded cover a field work may be 
cannonaded for hours and yet be very little the worse for wear, whilst 
the losses may be almost nil and on the artillery having to cease fire, 
owing to the advance of their infantry, the defenders will be in a posi¬ 
tion to offer almost as desperate a resistance as if the cannonade had 
never taken place. 
On the supposition that in the future field fortifications may play the 
same part in a campaign which they did in the Russo-Turkish war, 
Captain von Trotha draws the following conclusions :—• 
1st. That a considerable part of the field artillery must consist of 
considerably heavier calibres than have, up to the present time, been 
admitted for field artillery, in order to destroy the enemy's material 
defences. 
2nd. That field artillery guns of the smaller calibres must not seek 
to produce an effect at the longer ranges, but rather by directly 
supporting the attacking infantry. That small detachments, of even 
two guns, must immediately accompany the infantry, whilst the 
remainder, by skilful manoeuvring, should endeavour to concentrate 
their fire on important points, if possible from a flanking position. 
The losses in men and horses will no doubt be great, and in some 
cases the loss of guns will be unavoidable. 
A battery which, at a decisive point, can fire with destructive effect 
for five minutes, or even one minute, has been of more service to the 
general result than 10 batteries which have maintained a well-aimed 
but yet comparatively ineffective fire from judiciously selected positions 
in rear. 
It has been necessary to give the outlines of artillery action in late 
wars, in order to be able to draw our conclusions as to the direction in 
which improvements should tend. 
* In the later actions and attacks. 
t Instance the attack on Gornji Dubnik, on 24th October, 1877. 
