568 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY/ 1879 . 
—and these are the commonest phases of war—appear to be about 
equal. The offensive army, on the one hand, will generally have to 
attack previously prepared positions ; on the other hand, the importance 
of sacrificing mobility in order to obtain heavier guns is not so great 
with an army acting on the defensive. 
The present proportion of artillery for the corps artillery of an 
English corps d y armee is three horse artillery and two 16-pr. batteries. 
This was fixed nine years ago, and should be now increased by one or 
two batteries. 
I would propose four horse artillery and three heavy batteries. It 
seems advisable to increase the number of horse artillery batteries, in 
order to counteract, as far as possible, the loss of mobility entailed by 
substituting heavy field for medium field batteries. 
2. As long range is a sine qua non , it seems impracticable to use a 
gun of larger calibre than a 25-pr.; beyond this mobility may be said 
practically to cease. In India, we certainly have two heavy batteries 
of 40-prs., but the circumstances are exceptional, as they have elephants 
to draw the guns when not under fire ; in any other country it would 
be impracticable. With a 25-pr. we might still have considerable 
manoeuvring power; it would depend, however, much on the nature of 
the theatre of war whether even 25-prs. could be used with advantage. 
There is no reason why 40-prs. should not accompany an army, but 
they would have to march with the ammunition reserves; they could 
not form part of the manoeuvring portion of an army corps. As in the 
attack of a strongly entrenched position it is probable that cover will 
be thrown up, and guns placed in position during the night, it would 
be worth while considering whether it would not be advisable to have 
a 40-pr. battery per army corps with the ammunition reserve. 
C .—The idea of silencing field artillery by damaging the materiel 
has now quite exploded, and it is generally recognised that this object 
must be attained by disabling the men and horses. Many cases could 
be cited where batteries have been forced to go out of action, and some 
cases where they have even been unable to retire, owing to the enor¬ 
mous losses sustained. 
Hoffbauer, in his comments on the battle of Mars-la-Tour, says that 
many guns were obliged to cease firing until men could be brought up 
from the line of wagons. Towards the evening, the weakened batteries 
of the 5th Division were no longer able to move, in consequence of the 
difficulty of bringing up the wagons. Although batteries can often be 
kept out of infantry fire, still they may have to use case even in self- 
defence ; that is, the hostile infantry may advance within 400 yds. 
range. At this range the fire of infantry will soon render a battery 
hors de combat. This occurred at Mars-la-Tour to the 5th Light, 6th 
Light, and 2nd H.A. Batteries of the 3rd Regiment; and at Gravelotte 
to the 3rd Heavy and 3rd Light Batteries of the 9th Regiment.* 
# Hoffbauer. 
