SHORT NOTES ON PROFESSIONAL SUBJECTS. 
157 
and much less can their effect be compared with that of a shrapnel shell, which can 
reach the enemy when under cover, or with that of a common shell, which, by its 
superior power and great destructive action, is effective against a resisting object, 
and at greater distances. 
Not only are mitrailleuses incapable of competing with field artillery as regards 
the effects produced, and in a duel with the field gun, except perhaps at close 
quarters, would certainly come off second best, but they require just as extensive 
and costly an organisation and equipment as field artillery. Of course, if they are 
moved on the field by men, their tactical fiasco ought to be complete. 
In comparison with small-arms, mitrailleuses perform, at the best, as well as the 
corresponding number of infantry, which in a given time can fire the same number 
of shots, but with this important difference—that during this time the fighting fire 
of the infantry has been doing work for the tactical offensive. (This has been often 
proved in the case of the Prussians, by whom accuracy of shooting has been brought 
to such a pitch of perfection.) Now, the mitrailleuse can play no part in the 
offensive , and even in the absolute defensive occasions will more frequently present 
themselves in war for placing a half-company of infantry in a position favourable 
for their fire, and in which they are at the same time sheltered, than for placing a 
battery of six mitrailleuses, whose fire in the same time would not be greater in 
point of the total number of shots. 
On these grounds, we mean to say that the introduction of mitrailleuses, espe¬ 
cially for field warfare, is not warranted; and that it would be a fatal error to 
reduce the field artillery (as the French did last year), or to neglect to increase it, 
in order to organise a corresponding number of mitrailleuse batteries. 
But the more fruitful field for its use will be that which the siege of a fortress 
offers, and particularly in the fortress for direct defence against storming, as flank 
and caponier pieces for defence of the main ditch. Where we have to deal with 
living objects without cover in the open, where the length and breadth of the space 
which is to be swept lies within very narrow limits, and when as heavy a fire as 
possible has to be concentrated in a minimum of time and space, in this case all 
the advantages are decidedly on the side of the mitrailleuse. 
By substituting in flanks or caponiers the fire from a few mitrailleuses for that of 
small-arms and canister, the passage of the main ditch would be rendered almost 
impracticable for an assailant, and at the same time these weapons offer so small 
a mark, that the port-holes (which are purposely placed low down so as to bring 
a grazing fire on the ditch) can hardly be hit, much less destroyed, by the besieger’s 
indirect counter batteries—those most dangerous enemies of flank batteries and 
caponiers. 
We are therefore of opinion that the mitrailleuse only plays a comparatively 
modest and subordinate part in war, and that its real and successful future will 
be found rather in sieges. 
96. A Proposed Plan for Carrying the Detachments with Field 
Artillery. 
(Communicated by Captain S. Penny, B.A.) 
1. To increase the length of the axletree-box to double its present length, to 
enable two men to be carried back to back, as formerly, on the wagon body. 
2. To do away with the iron guard at the back of the axletree seats on the new 
