HISTORY OF MAURITIUS. 
5i3 
beyond five hundred European regular troops in the two islands. I doubt not but the 
French will take care for the future not to be surprised in such a weak state. 
“ With all the deference due to those who formed the plan of the unsuccessful ex¬ 
pedition under Commodore Johnstone, it will not be amiss to observe, that if the 
attack of the Isle of France had been the object of it, it might then have been con¬ 
quered by an attack prudently directed; which would have been a surer source of 
glory for those who had undertaken it, and for the nation in general, than even the 
battle of Porta Praya, or the taking of the Cape of Good Hope. It may be consi¬ 
dered as presumption in me to give my opinion on a subject of such importance; 
but as I write in the confidence of friendship, and after having attentively exa¬ 
mined the matter, I think my observations will not be totally useless. I am at pre¬ 
sent so perfectly convinced of the inutility of any attempt to overthrow the French 
power in the Indies without first reducing the Isles of France and Bourbon, that 
were another war to break out between the two rival nations I should humbly and 
strongly recommend, to the government of Great Britain, not to lose time in making 
a vigorous attack upon these islands, as the most efficacious and quickest means 
in gaining our object; such an expedition would perhaps be accompanied with 
some loss, but it would fall far short of that which a lengthened and perhaps 
unfortunate war would occasion. 
“ It would not perhaps be a very difficult thing for some men of war and frigates 
stationed between the Isles of France, Bourbon, and Madagascar, with two cruizers 
fixed to the south-east, and two others to the south-west, or to windward of the island, 
to reduce Port Louis by famine in a short space of time; the troops to be sent 
should be Europeans, or Sepoys sent from Madras, or Europeans from England 
itself. I think that four thousand Europeans alone, or two thousand Europeans and 
four thousand Sepoys, with a just proportion of ships of war, would completely 
effectuate this enterprize. 
” The works at the two extremities of the town of Port Louis being very open 
and extensive, the enemy’s forces might be very much divided by landing an equal 
number of troops on each side of the port, who, however, ought to pay great 
attention to act in concert, by means of well-directed signals, as well by day as by 
night, in case of a projected attack or any other movement of the enemy. At the 
same time two men. of war, with several gun-boats or fire-ships, placed at the open¬ 
ing of the port, might hold themselves in readiness, if the enemy threatened a seriohs 
3 u 
