THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
97 
First, as regards tlie probability of striking the enemy's ships. Upon 
this there can be, we imagine, but little difference of opinion; for although 
a gun on an immoveable platform will have a considerable advantage, as 
regards the degree of certainty of striking the object fired at, over a similar 
gun on board ship, when the range exceeds a few hundred yards, still, if the 
latter can be brought within 200 yds. of the object, whilst the operations of 
the former must be carried on against a moveable object at ranges varying 
from 1000 yds. to 2000 yds., the ship gun cannot fail to have a very decided 
superiority over the gun in battery. 
Secondly, as to the effect of the striking shot, no one can question the 
superiority of the moveable floating battery in respect to this particular; 
for in the case of the forts the effect would be comparatively nil, but with 
the floating batteries every shot could be made to penetrate. 
It has already been noticed that our floating batteries would have a 
superiority, both as regards offence and defence, over the enemy's mortar 
vessels and gun boats. As this, I believe, will be generally admitted, it 
would perhaps be superfluous to enter into details. However, there is one 
particular connected with this point which deserves special notice; namely, 
that while our ships need only be furnished with the means of resisting the 
attack, the enemy would have to make provision for the materiel to effect the 
special object in view, that is, the bombardment—and, in addition, must be 
provided with the means of opposing the force that will be brought against 
them. 
It would appear, therefore, that moveable floating batteries would have 
immeasurable advantages over permanent forts in resisting a bombardment 
of Portsmouth dockyard; and, also, that these moveable batteries would be 
able effectually to oppose an enemy in any attempt of this sort. 
It is true that the Royal Commissioners in their report recommend move- 
able floating batteries but only upon the following grounds :—“ Because they 
would be in some instances most serviceable as auxiliaries to the per¬ 
manent fortifications for the defence of harbours and inner watersand, 
“ because, that such vessels would be of great value during an attack, from 
their capability of moving to the assistance of any of the forts requiring 
support;" so that, according to the Commissioners' views, it would be 
necessary for the enemy to silence the fire of the forts before they could 
effect their object as regards the bombardment; but, if what has been stated 
is correct, the enemy need not attack the forts at all, as they would be 
powerless to interrupt their operations in any material degree. 
I will now briefly notice one or two of the chief arguments which have 
been lately brought forward by the advocates of permanent forts, in support 
of their views. 
It has been said that the forts at Portsmouth will materially assist the 
floating batteries in their operations against the enemy, and that the two 
Spithead forts in particular would be able to take the enemy in reverse, while 
our ships were engaging them on the other side. 
Under some circumstances, no doubt, permanent forts might be able to 
render valuable assistance to a naval force. In the particular case before us, 
however, the conditions are not, in my opinion, such as to warrant any 
reliance being placed upon them in the way of assisting the floating batteries, 
and in respect to “ taking the enemy's ships in reverse," if we consider the 
