98 
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF 
relative positions of onr ships and those of the enemy when engaged, it is 
evident that the fire from the forts would be as likely, or nearly so, to injure 
the one ship as the other. 
Some there are who advocate fortifications generally—upon the ground, 
first, of their permanent character; and, secondly, “ because of their being 
less liable to fluctuations than almost any other elements of defence.” It 
must be admitted, however, that, if a fortification fails to attain the object 
for which it was designed, its permanency becomes a positive evil, as its 
existence under these circumstances cannot fail, in a country like this, to act 
most prejudiciously, either by inducing a false security, or in weakening the 
hands of government, in providing what is really necessary for the safety of 
the country. 
And, as regards “ fortifications being less liable to fluctuation than almost 
any other element of defence,” although this may be so, still the altered 
conditions in relation to the protection of ships have practically rendered the 
great majority of permanent works now in existence, as well as those in pro¬ 
cess of construction, comparatively valueless, so far as concerns the objects 
for which they were designed; for what has been stated about the Portsmouth 
forts applies with nearly as much, and in some greater, force to the arrange¬ 
ments proposed by the Royal Commissioners for the defence of the country. 
As regards the fortifications at Plymouth, for instance, the conditions are 
nearly the same as those which appertain to Portsmouth—the only difference 
being, that the enemy's ships would be exposed to the artillery fire from the 
forts at a range of about 1400 to 1500 yds. instead of, as at Portsmouth, 
2000 yds.—a difference, which practically, would be of little consequence. 
Even in the Medway the proposed forts would be of little avail in preventing 
the enemy's iron-clad ships from destroying the dockyards at Sheerness and 
Chatham. 
In relation to those works which have been recommended, as a protection 
against bombardment by an enemy from the land side, it appears to me that, 
since the adoption of the new system of protecting ships from artillery fire, 
the landing of an enemy on our coasts may be reasonably considered as an 
event, so unlikely to occur, as to render it entirely unnecessary to provide 
for a defence on the land side—for if we were provided with iron-clad vessels 
of great speed, surely no enemy would attempt, to convey a large force in 
unprotected transports, and then to land them in open boats, when opposed 
even by a small number of iron-clad vessels; for although the enemy might 
be provided with a large protecting force of iron-clad ships, these could not 
interfere in a way to prevent the destruction of the transports and boats, 
provided our ships have such facilities of motion as would appear to be 
attainable in a class of vessel specially constructed for this purpose. 
In conclusion, I would observe, that although I entertain a most decided 
opinion as to the uselessness of the arrangement lately proposed for the 
defence of the country by land forts, I nevertheless believe that any attempt 
made by a ship to silence the fire of a fort would completely fail, provided 
both were on an equality as regards the special advantages which naturally 
belong to each; and consequently—if in any particular case an enemy's 
ship cannot attain its object until it has silenced the fire of a fort, then, in 
such a case, a permanent fort should, no doubt, be resorted to, in preference 
to a floating battery, as a means of defence. 
