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that they would still further recommend themselves, on this important 
consideration. » 
Some change must of necessity occur not merely in the construction of 
future forts, but in remodelling existing ones; for, to use Colonel Boxer’s 
words, the altered conditions in relation to the protection of ships, have 
practically rendered the majority of permanent works now in existence, 
comparatively valueless, so far as concerns the objects for which they were 
designed. The public should make this fact familiar to themselves; and, while 
reconciling themselves to the idea of a necessary and imminent change, they 
should endeavour to obtain some system which, while containing the element 
of permanency, can still be adopted at moderate outlay, and can be intro¬ 
duced into existing forts without sacrificing the advantages they may already 
possess; and this is what the proposed plan claims to be. 
We mentioned a frontier like that of Canada, as one of the fields for such 
towers; and the same arguments must apply to this as to the defence of 
an extended coast. But we must speak with reservation of fortifying a line 
of such enormous length; and generally content ourselves with strengthen¬ 
ing merely points near the lakes and cities, the narrows on the rivers, and 
points on the lines of railway, which from their importance would invite 
attack. Bor in general on so extended aline we would trust to armies in the 
field and to such fieldworks, as, by taking advantage of natural positions, 
they would throw up. In the recent operations on the rivers of the Southern 
States by the gunboats of theBederals, a few cupola-covered towers situated 
at those points where the vessels must come within range, and on positions 
which would command the anchorage, whose space on a river would not be 
extensive, would have materially affected that part of the campaign in which 
alone the Bederals have undoubtedly always had the advantage. 
But a main point for consideration is the employment of these towers in 
the defence of large, unfortified cities. The day is gone when they could 
be walled in as of old; and in tracing the remains of the fortifications that 
formerly encompassed many towns, we learn that, however effective against 
external attack, they have failed signally to check the growth from within. 
And yet, as in the case of London, there are times when one views with 
apprehension the facility with which an enemy could unresisted enter and 
sack the city; and here the cupola tower again comes in. It does away with 
the necessity of huge, unwieldy lines of fortification, expensive to build, and 
impossible to man; for by placing them at considerable intervals round the 
city, chiefly however on the main roads and railways by which an enemy 
would advance, sufficient delay would be gained to enable a larger force to be 
interposed between the object of attack and the enemy. 
And in contemplating invasion, and preparing to meet it, all that seems to 
me to be necessary to ensure is the delay of the invading army. Bor to an 
invader, delay is defeat: to carry on lengthened operations in an enemy’s 
country with the communications cut off, and an accumulating army in front 
is a weary, hopeless, task ; and however it may be varied by occasional fruit¬ 
less victories, it must end in defeat and submission. But this delay cannot be 
obtained with our modern little fieldworks or martello towers; it requires 
towers such as I have described; each powerful enough to hold out for some 
considerable time, and none so dependent on the others as to be materially 
affected by their capture. 
