THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
217 
In a critique which appeared in a military periodical on my former article, 
the argument of economy by adopting the cupola in large fortresses was 
hardly admitted, provided it involved the altering of existing forts; although 
the writer agreed with me as far as the armament of future forts was con¬ 
cerned. And yet, without cavilling at words, we may ask whether economy 
merely refers to present outlay, or also has an interest in the means taken to 
prevent future loss. No one calls it extravagance when we adopt the system 
of plating our men-of-war; it would, indeed, be a criminal economy to do 
otherwise. Let us apply the same reasoning to our old forts, and the saving 
of guns and gunners would be speedily a satisfactory repayment. At all 
events, let us put a cupola over the gun in every salient, and over those on 
the cavalier; and in all future works let the cupola system in its entirety 
be adopted. 
It must be at once apparent that half the number of guns which con¬ 
stitute the armament of a fortress at present would be ample, if the 
ordnance were cupola-protected. If a cupola can receive with impunity 
such severe direct lire as on board the Trusty and the Monitor it was exposed 
to, it is secure from any injury from ricochet fire, when the charges are so 
enormously reduced; and virtually against forts so armed ricochet fire would 
be useless, and probably never employed. Thus a great means of silencing 
the guns of a fortress is lost; and less allowance for casualties to the ordnance 
being required to be made, a reduction in their number can be made in pro¬ 
portion. As, also, we can place our cupolas on a much higher level than the 
terreplein of the work,—on a plane indeed with the superior slope, we get 
more command for our guns, and can give them greater depression relative 
to the slope of the glacis,—a most important thing during a siege. 
There is another consideration also which although at first sight seem¬ 
ingly insignificant, would during a siege be practically important. There is 
no doubt that the fire of both artillery and infantry is much steadier under 
cover than when exposed; and this accounts for the comparative failure in 
modern engagements of the improved fire-arms, whose results were expected 
to be very marked in their superiority over the old weapons. Even in the 
hands of men like the Confederate troops in America, who are familiar from 
boyhood with the rifie, the improved weapon has produced results which 
considering the proportion of killed to those engaged, have frequently been 
ludicrous. With guns like the Armstrong, requiring great nicety in laying, 
and with sights and scales much more complicated than the old smooth¬ 
bores required, it may reasonably be expected that in the heat of action 
there will not be anything like the marvellous accuracy of fire, which has 
been obtained in practice. But a great assistance will be gained, if we put 
the guns under cupolas, and the laying can take place undisturbed by the 
enemy's fire. 
Another military paper, also alluding to my former article, expresses 
uncertainty as to the effect which would take place on the cupola by the 
crumbling of the parapet or rampart underneath. Although this is a 
question more for the practical engineer who would have the erection, still 
I can conceive no difficulty in giving extraneous support to a cupola by 
means of simple shafts from the casemates below, which would render it 
independent of the earthen part of the work, and at the same time afford 
facilities for the construction of the communication between the interior of 
