3 
present circumstances, are not equal to the task imposed upon them by 
the exigencies of modern civilized war. The English officer in the 
field is far inferior to the theoretically and practically excellently 
trained German officer, and we may without boasting say, to the 
Austrian also. Whether, in the present state of military organization 
in England, it is possible to improve the training of officers, is a 
question to which we can hardly give an answer in the affirmative.” 
In the first two numbers of the 21st volume, a biography oi 
Colonel F. W. Rustow, a well-known military litterateur, who died 
lately, has been published. From the list of his works, it appears that he 
wrote no less than fifty-two books, on all branches of military art, 
some of them of world wide reputation, and including very well 
written and detailed histories of the wars of 1796-7,1805,1848,1854-5, 
1859, both in Hungary and Italy, 1860 in Italy, 1864, 1866, 1870, 
1875-6, and 1877-8 in the East. 
Of great technical interest is an account of the operations of the 
Floating Ambulances on the Sare, and the Railway Sanitary trains 
during the Occupation of Bosnia in 1878-79, by Hr. Myrdacz, of the 
Austrian Army. 
“ The Development of the tactics of the French Army during the 
Napoleonic Wars (till 1807)” by Captain von Karstenfels, of the 
Hungarian Landwehr, is a most interesting paper. After a short 
sketch of the causes of the revolution, and the state of feeling of the 
French people, he proceeds to enquire into the causes of the striking 
triumphs of the French Army, which he attributes to their putting the 
greatest possible number of men into the field, to the extraordinary 
mobility of those troops caused by the utter absence of impedimenta, 
to the extended introduction of light infantry, light cavalry, to the 
“ flying ” artillery, and finally to the extended nature of the theatres 
of war. The veteran armies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia were 
defeated by sheer astonishment at the mode of attack of the enthusiastic 
republicans, rushing on at all points in great numbers and shouting 
their “ Marseillaise.” The squad and battalion drill of the French 
were the same as those of their opponents, also their minor tactics ; 
therefore it is not to those we must look to find out the secret of the 
French success, but to their strategy, and the wonderful spirit which 
animated the troops.* Discipline in the lower ranks was very slack, 
the republican catechism teaching that it was better to make a man 
ashamed of a crime than to punish him ; but that of the leaders 
was perfect, the most implicit obedience being exacted from them to 
the orders of the central war council. Summing up, the secret of the 
French success was contained in the following principles:—To attain 
a numerical superiority to the enemy; to simplify the instruction of 
the soldier; to be as mobile as possible; to move as quickly as possible ; 
to extend the theatre of war to the utmost; to make decisions quickly, 
and carry them out with determination; and, lastly, absolute discipline 
and obedience in the higher ranks. The article is interesting and 
readable, but it seems curious that no mention is made in it of the 
famous battalion columns of attack so much used by the Republicans, 
