LAWS RELATING TO BEES 
559 
solute and permanent ownership, while in 
regards to the former only a qualified prop¬ 
erty can exist, and the distinction is based 
upon the extent to which they can be domes¬ 
ticated or brought under the control and do¬ 
minion of man, and not at all upon, the fer¬ 
ocity of their disposition or their proneness 
to do mischief. For instance, the dog, some 
species of which are extremely savage and 
ferocious, is uniformly classed among ani¬ 
mals domitae naturae, while the hare, rab¬ 
bit, and dove are termed ferae naturae altho 
completely harmless. It would not be nat¬ 
ural to suppose that a classification adopted 
with exclusive reference to one quality of 
animals could be safely used to define and 
regulate the responsibilities growing out of 
other and different qualities; nor would it 
accord with that just analysis and logical 
accuracy which distinguishes the common 
law, that it should be resorted to for that 
purpose. 
Chitty, under the head of actions on the 
case for negligence, gives the following rule: 
‘ ‘ The owner of domestic or other animals, 
not naturally inclined to do mischief, as 
dogs, horses, and oxen, is not liable for any 
injury committed by them to the person or 
personal property unless it can be shown 
that he previously had notice of the ani¬ 
mal’s mischievous propensity;” Chitty 
Plead. 82. This accurate elementary writer 
did not fall into the error of applying the 
rule to the whole of the class of animals 
domitae, but adds the qualifications, “not 
naturally inclined to do mischief. ’ ’ By his 
arrangement of the subject, too, he con¬ 
firms the view of Peake that the liability 
is based upon negligence. 
These authorities seem to me to point to 
the following conclusions: 
1. That one who owns or keeps an animal 
of any kind becomes liable for any injury 
the animal may do, only on the ground of 
some actual or presumed negligence on his 
part. 
2. That it is essential to the proof of neg¬ 
ligence and sufficient evidence thereof that 
the owner be shown to have notice of the 
propensity of the animal to do mischief. 
3. That proof that the animal is of a sav¬ 
age and ferocious nature is equivalent to 
proof of express notice. In such cases no¬ 
tice is presumed. 
.Having shown then, I think 
clearly, that the liability does not depend 
upon the classification of the animal doing 
the injury, but upon its propensity to do 
mischief, it remains to be considered wheth¬ 
er bees are animals of so ferocious a disposi¬ 
tion that any one who keeps them, under 
any circumstances, does so at his peril. If 
it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and 
prove the mischievous nature of the ani¬ 
mal, nothing of the kind has been done in 
this case; but if the courts are to take ju¬ 
dicial notice of the nature of things so fa¬ 
miliar to man as bees, which I suppose they 
would be justified in doing, then I would 
observe that however it may have been an¬ 
ciently, in modern days the bee has become 
as completely domesticated as the ox or 
cow. Its habits and instincts have been 
studied, and thru the knowledge thus ac¬ 
quired it can be controlled and managed 
with nearly as much certainty as any of the 
domesticated animals; and altho it may be 
proper still to classify it among those ferae 
naturae, it must nevertheless be regarded as 
coming very near the dividing line, and in 
regards to its propensities to do mischief, I 
apprehend that such a thing as a serious 
injury to person or property from its at¬ 
tacks is very rare, not occurring in ratio 
more frequent certainly than injuries aris¬ 
ing from the kick of a horse or a bite of a 
dog. 
There is one rule to be extracted from the 
authorities to which I have referred, not yet 
noticed, and that is that the law looks with 
more favor upon the keeping of animals use¬ 
ful to man than such as are noxious and use¬ 
less. And the keeping of the one, altho in 
some rare instances they may do injury, will 
be tolerated and encouraged, while there is 
nothing to excuse the keeping of the other. 
In the case of Vrooman vs. Lawyer, 13 John. 
Rep. 339, the court says: “If damage be 
done by any animal kept for use or conven¬ 
ience, the owner is not liable to an action 
without notice. ’ ’ The utility of bees no one 
will question ,and hence there is nothing to 
call for the application of a very stringent 
rule to the case. Upon the whole, therefore, 
I am clearly of the opinion that the owner 
of bees is not liable at all events for any 
accidental injury they may do. The question 
is still left whether the keeping of bees so 
near the highway subjects the defendant to 
a responsibility which would not otherwise 
rest upon him. I consider this question sub¬ 
stantially disposed of by the evidence in the 
case. It appears that the bees had been kept 
in the same situation for eight or nine years, 
and no proof was offered of the slightest in¬ 
jury having ever been done by them. On the 
contrary, some of the witnesses testified 
that they had lived in the neighborhood and 
had been in the habit of passing and re¬ 
passing frequently with teams and other¬ 
wise without ever having been molested. 
This rebuts the idea of notice to the de¬ 
fendant, either from the nature of the bees 
or otherwise, that it would be dangerous to 
keep them in that situation, and of course, 
upon the principles already settled, he could 
not be held liable. 
The judgment of the county court must be 
affirmed. 
The two cases last mentioned (Parsons 
vs. Manser and Earl vs. Van Alstine) are 
in perfect harmony. In the first case the 
evidence showed the beekeeper was at 
■fault; in the second, no negligence of the 
