38 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
The proposal of peace made to France in January of 1796 has usually 
been regarded as a mere ruse on the part of Pitt and as intended 
wholly for the benefit of the partisans of peace among his own fol¬ 
lower^.* * * § The vigorous English preparations for a continuance of the 
war and the extreme retrocessions insisted upon by Pitt if peace were 
made are cited in support of this view ; but those who hold it have 
failed to appreciate the real hope Pitt felt that the convulsions in 
France were about to end in the establishment of a government in¬ 
clined to give up the territories acquired during the last few years in 
return for an acknowledgment of its own stability and permanence. 
(} Pitt knew nothing of the sentiment rapidly developing in France 
tending to identify patriotism with the retention of the left bank of 
the Rhine.f He honestly believed that the French government ought, 
if sensible, to be satisfied with recognition within its ancient limits, 
and thus believing, he hoped for peace. His excessive ideas as to the 
extent of the necessary retrocessions were therefore due to a failure 
to appreciate the actual situation, and are not an evidence of a lack of 
good faith. In regard to the continuance of military preparations, 
Pitt’s fixed idea was that he could use them to awe France into signing 
a peace, I and in any case it would have been the height of folly to 
limit England’s readiness for war before a negotiation was actually 
begun. The relations of England and Austria in the summer and fall 
of 1795 are evidence that Pitt really desired and hoped for peace, for 
although Pelham was not sent to Vienna, Morton Eden was instructed 
repeatedly to secure from Thugut a definite answer as to whether he 
wished to recover the Netherlands, and Jackson in September was 
despatched as a special envoy to confer upon this point. Thugut re¬ 
fused an explicit answer,§ and the suspicions of Austria’s duplicity, 
constantly forwarded by English agents abroad, caused the English 
ministry to fear that Austria was preparing to yield the Netherlands 
j to France in return for territory elsewhere. France was in fact offer¬ 
ing Bavaria to Austria in compensation for the left bank of the Rhine. || 
The central point of English policy at this time was that France should 
snot be permitted to retain Belgium, and Pitt was eager to press this 
solution while Austria was still in alliance with England. In England 
* For example see Sybel, IV, 140^. 
f Sorel, IV, 374 : “ C’est un brevet de ‘ patriotisme ’ que de se prononcer pour le 
barriere du Rhin.” But J. H. Rose controverts this. See article in English His¬ 
torical Review , April, 1903, p. 287. Rose also maintains the genuineness of the 
English offer of peace. 
t Pitt to Addington, Oct. 4, 1795. Stanhope, II, 328. 
§ Morton Eden to Auckland, Nov. 8, 1795. Auckland, III, 320. 
|| Sorel, IV, 425. 
