52 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
would have necessitated Prussia’s abandonment of her neutrality. 
George III distrusted the Prussian court and termed its proposals 
‘ ‘ insidious advances, ’ ’ * * * § and even Grenville himself thought an attempt 
was being made to weaken the strength of the alliance between Austria 
and England.f Nevertheless he instructed Elgin to confer freely with 
the ministers at Berlin, informed Thugut of the Prussian opening ,X 
and outlined a plan of alliance. But the hopes aroused at this juncture 
were suddenly dashed to the ground when, on March 30, he received 
from Elgin a copy of the secret treaty of August 5, 1796, between 
France and Prussia.§ All expectations of a change in Prussian policy 
or of honor in the Prussian court were abruptly set aside, and Gren¬ 
ville, temporarily at least, became wholly convinced of the uselessness 
of further efforts in that quarter. || 
The dismay aroused in England upon learning the terms of the secret 
treaty between Prussia and France was almost immediately increased 
by the news of Bonaparte’s rapid and decisive victories in Italy and 
the Tyrol. It was evident that Austria must yield and yield soon, or 
experience the dishonor of a French occupation of Vienna. Even 
Grenville was dispirited and hopeless H and passively submitted to Pitt’s 
determination to huriy an envoy to Vienna in time to take part in the 
peace negotiations. On April 9 it was decided by the Cabinet to send 
Hammond with full powers to enter into a negotiation with France and 
Austria.** Hammond’s instructions permitted him to offer France all 
colonies taken during the course of the war except the Cape, Ceylon, 
and Trinidad, and to acquiesce in any territorial arrangement on the 
continent acceptable to Austria, ft Thus England w r as at last ready to 
recognize the incorporation of Belgium with France, and Pitt specific¬ 
ally approved both this and the continued dependence of Holland on 
France, if only peace were secured,^ while Grenville had yielded his 
own opinion under the first impressions created by the discouraging 
news from Austria. George III, recognizing Grenville’s discourage- 
* George III to Pitt, Feb. 28, 1797. Stanhope, III, Appendix, p. 11. 
t Grenville to Elgin, March 2, 1797. Dropmore, III, 298. 
j Grenville to Morton Eden, March 3, 1797. Ibid. 
§ George III to Grenville Ibid., 304. 
|| Grenville to Woronzow, March 30, 1797. Ibid., 306. 
Grenville to George III, April 9, 1797. Ibid., 310. 
** Minutes of Cabinet meeting. Ibid. 
ft Sybel, IV, 493. The exact terms of the instructions to Hammond are in a de¬ 
spatch of April 11, 1797, to Sir Morton Eden, being No. 24, in volume 49 of the 
British Foreign Office Records for Austria. The English proposal was to keep 
Ceylon and the Cape from Holland, and either Martinique from France or Trinidad 
from Spain, and Tobago or St. Lucia from France. These terms are of interest 
as indicating Pitt’s first decision in turning toward peace. Later he lowered 
these conditions very nearly to the point of demanding nothing at all. 
ff George III to Pitt, April 9, 1797. Stanhope, III, Appendix, p. in. 
