58 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
Hope, Cochin, and Trinidad, but this was met on the part of France 
by the presentation of a note involving three preliminary points which 
it was asserted the English government must yield before any other 
questions were raised. These were the renunciation of the ancient 
claim to France included in the King’s title, the restoration of the ships 
seized at Toulon or the payment of a satisfactory indemnity, and the 
release of all claim to the revenues of the Netherlands founded on the 
English loan to Austria. The latter point was of no importance, for 
the English loan was based on the revenues of the Austrian Empire, 
not, as the French supposed, on those of the Netherlands alone.* Nor 
is it probable that the first and second points would ever have been 
permitted to stand in the w T ay of a final treaty ; but the annoyance felt 
because of the French demand for a preliminary concession by England 
aroused a feeling of irritation in the Cabinet and encouraged Grenville 
to believe that peace might yet be averted. While he was careful to 
write privately to Malmesbury in such terms as to indicate a personal 
desire for peace, the undercurrent of feeling evident in his letters and 
the haughty tone of his official despatches evince his real sentiments. 
, Keenly alive to every shift of political opinion in England, he now 
sought to hold Pitt to his original instructions to Malmesbury, in the 
hope that these, if adhered to, would prevent the completion of a treaty. 
A few days later Grenville’s position was strengthened by an assertion 
on the part of the French negotiators that they were unable to discuss 
the colonial acquisitions desired by England, inasmuch as the Directory 
had pledged itself in a treaty with Holland ‘ ‘ not to surrender Dutch 
colonies without the consent of the Dutch government.” f In regard 
to the three points, Grenville at once wrote to Malmesbury that the 
French opening did not seem favorable to peace, X but Canning, who 
did not take the French demands seriously, wrote to Ellis : 
‘ * Which of us is there that does not feel it grating to have to con¬ 
trive modes of concession, instead of enforcing the justice of de¬ 
mands ? ' ' * * But we cannot and must not disguise our situation 
from ourselves. If peace is to be had, we must have it; I firmty 
believe we must, and it is a belief that strengthens every day. ' * * 
But though I preach peace thus violently, do not imagine that I am 
ready to take any.that you may offer. * Give us then some¬ 
thing to shew as an acquisition but remember * that what 
may be very splendid as an acquisition, would be very insufficient as a 
* Grenville to Malmesbury, July 13, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 394. 
t Fitzpatrick’s introduction to Dropmore, III, xlviii- 1 . This presents a very 
clearly stated and compact rdsumd of the negotiations at Lille. 
t Grenville to Malmesbury, July 13, 1797. /did., 333. 
