THE NEGOTIATIONS AT IJEEE. 
59 
cause of quarrel. We can break off upon nothing but what will rouse 
us from sleep and stupidity into a new life and action, what ‘ will 
create a soul under the ribs of death ! ’ for we are now soul-less and 
spiritless; and what would, do this, except the defence of Portugal * * * * 
or the preservation of our integrity, • * * • I know not. All beyond 
this we shall like to have, but we never shall fight for it.” * 
In spite of this readiness to concede all, the immediate effect of the 
French stand on the question of the Dutch colonies was to stiffen the 
attitude of the English government. On July 20, a week after the 
letter just quoted, Canning wrote to Malmesbury that, if the French 
remained fixed in the determination to refuse any Dutch colony and 
remained also as offensive in their manner of stating it, the negotia¬ 
tions would have to terminate,f while Grenville, in much more vigorous 
language, stated the same opinion.]; 
Grenville now not only exhibited greater hauteur in his official com¬ 
munications, but also began actively to combat Pitt in the Cabinet. A 
source of strength to Pitt was the public disinclination to continue 
the war. Grenville discovered that the events of the negotiation were 
known in Eondon almost as soon as received by the ministers,§ and 
proposed in the Cabinet a vote imposing secrecy upon its members. 
This was passed and, according to Canning, “was devised by Lord 
Grenville to tie up Pitt's tongue alone , whom he suspected of communi¬ 
cating with other persons, and fortifying himself with out-of-door 
opinions against the opinions which might be brought forward in 
Council by those with whom he differed in his general view of the 
Negotiation. I am not sure that he did not suspect him further of 
sounding the public sentiment through the newspapers as to the terms 
which it might be proper to accept, and the concessions which it might 
be excusable to make for the sake of peace.” || Grenville had in fact 
secured a tactical victory over Pitt. Every resolution of the Cabinet 
that involved a decision not wholly agreeable to Pitt was a step toward 
Grenville’s resumption of influence. So also every event that in¬ 
creased the impression of French insolence and of English humiliation 
was magnified by Grenville in his effort to renew the courage of the 
English government, and in this connection Malmesbury had unwit¬ 
tingly assisted the war party in the Cabinet, for he had dwelt much 
* July 13, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 396. Ellis was Malmesbury’s right-hand man 
at Eille and was a close friend of Canning’s. Thus Pitt and Malmesbury were in 
close touch through their younger intimates. 
t Ibid ., 416. 
j Grenville to Malmesbury, July 20, 1797. Dropmore, III, 333 . 
I Ibid. 
I| Canning to Malmesbury, July 20, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 416. 
