62 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Malmesbury was convinced 
of Maret’s honesty and advised his government to await the issue 
of the struggle at Paris. All knowledge of Maret’s disclosures and 
of the frequent communications which passed between Malmesbury 
Wd Maret during the ensuing month was, at the suggestion of Can¬ 
ning, kept from the English Cabinet, Pitt and Grenville alone being 
cognizant of what was taking place. Canning’s avowed reason for 
this secrecy was the necessity of protecting Maret’s good name,* but, 
in the light of his letter to Ellis, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
he had also in view the prevention of a recurrence of those acrimonious 
debates in the Cabinet which had lately resulted in a temporary victory 
for Grenville. If so, his plan, while successful in the direct object 
sought, was hazardous in its effect upon the main question of peace, 
for it necessitated a renewal of that personal and private intercourse 
between Grenville and Pitt which recent events had tended to prevent. 
While the negotiations at Lille were thus delayed until some solu¬ 
tion was reached at Paris, it was still necessary to preserve the usual 
diplomatic forms of a conference, and in forwarding instructions to 
Malmesbury Grenville clearly revealed his opposition to peace. Al¬ 
though acknowledging the probability that Maret was dealing honestly 
with Malmesbury,f he wrote the latter on August 18 : 
“ I greatly doubt whether the period of peace is yet arrived. There 
seems so much insolence, and such an overbearing opinion of their own 
consequence and power even among those who profess themselves the 
best disposed, that I fear it will be impossible yet to obtain such terms 
as we must require.” X 
His language in communicating with the King, of whose sympathy 
he felt confident, was more open. As to what terms of peace might 
be expected if Maret’s plan was successful, he wrote on August 4 : 
‘ 1 It appears however that nothing had passed on that head beyond 
the general expression of reasonable terms, and an implied concession 
that your Majesty was entitled to some compensation, but without 
intimating anything of its nature or amount. Lord Grenville does not 
therefore flatter himself that much more results from this communica- 
* Canning to Grenville, July 31, 1797. Dropmore, III, 337. By the plan fol¬ 
lowed, Malmesbury’s despatches used numerals for names, in mentioning Maret and 
others whom Maret employed in communicating with Malmesbury, and they are 
thus given in the Dropmore MSS. But the actual names were long ago printed in 
Malmesbury’s diary. The King was aware of and consented to the withholding 
of these despatches from the rest of the Cabinet. Ibid., 343. Malmesbury himself 
saw no reason for such secrecy, though he wished to protect Maret. Malmesbury 
to Canning, Aug. 14, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 465. 
t Grenville to Malmesbury, Aug. 9, 1797. Dropmore, III, 352. 
t Ibid., 356. 
