THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LILLE. 
63 
tion than that the moderate party were desirous to prevent the nego¬ 
tiation from being abruptly terminated pending the struggle at Paris ; 
but, if they should succeed, there seems no sufficient ground to rely 
on their being actuated by any other disposition for peace than what 
would arise from a motive to the operation of which their adversaries 
would, under the like circumstances, be equally, or even more exposed, 
the great difficult}^ which they would find in continuing the war.”* * * § 
Pitt, however, was hopeful, basing his expectations upon Malmes¬ 
bury’s confidence in Maret’s integrity, and for a month longer the 
negotiation waited upon the turn of events in Paris. Malmesbury, on 
his part, sought to follow Canning’s injunctions in regard to the con¬ 
flict in the English Cabinet, going so far even as to conceal such parts of 
Ellis’s conversations w r ith Pein as departed from a stiff maintenance of 
English demands,f and writing on August 14 : “ This messenger will 
not, I think, carry over any materials for a Cabinet discussion.” J 
Malmesbury’s precautions were unavailing, for an unexpected event 
soon revived the conflict of opinion in England, and in its consequences 
almost convinced Malmesbury himself that Pitt was yielding to the 
influence of the war party. Malmesbury learned August 12 that a 
treaty between France and Portugal had been signed at Paris by which 
Portugal agreed to assume a position of neutralit}^ in any war between 
France and England, and not to permit more than six ships of either 
nation in her ports during the continuance of that war.§ This treaty 
was disavowed when it was forwarded to Lisbou, but in the meantime 
it had greatly angered the English government. Grenville instructed 
* Dropmore, III, 343. 
fThe reports sent to England, of the conversations between Ellis and Pein, and 
later between Malmesbury and Maret, are given in Dropmore. Comparing these 
with the reports made by Ellis to Malmesbury (as given in Malmesbury), it is evi¬ 
dent that the accounts sent to Grenville were carefully edited. In the following 
illustration the portions enclosed in parentheses were in the original report by Ellis 
to Malmesbury, while the report as actually sent to Grenville is to be read by 
omitting the enclosed portions. Ellis said “ that the Cape (I was very sure, was not 
an object of profit to any nation ; that it w r as necessary, like Ceylon, for the pres¬ 
ervation of our territory ; and that, from the little I had heard on the subject, I saw 
no reason for believing that we attached such importance to it as to let it stand 
in the way of the attainment of any great national object, but that it) was ours at 
present, and that he had not heard a shadow of reason why we should part with it. 
Lastly, that our demand of Cochin was only in return for Negapatnam, which was, 
he conceived, of much higher value to the Dutch. Here le Pein said, (with much 
eagerness. “ Vous m’etonnez beaucoup. Oh,) si vous vouliez rendre le Cap, je suis 
bien persuade qu’il ne tiendrait qu’a vous de signer la paix dans quinze jours.” 
Malmesbury, III, 470-471, and Dropmore, III, 348. It is evident that the omissions 
in the report to Grenville were made solely because the full conversation would 
have given ground for a new controversy with Pitt. Many such omissions are found 
by comparing Malmesbury and the Dropmore MSS., and most of them were made 
for similar reasons. 
t Malmesbury to Canning. Malmesbury, III, 465. 
§ Malmesbury to Grenville, Aug. 14, 1797. Ibid ., 461. 
