64 the INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
\ 
Malmesbury that England could not submit to any such stipulation, 
and that articles in regard to it must be inserted in the treaty to be 
signed at Eille.* * * § At the same time Grenville exhibited resentment to 
a published declaration by the Directory to the effect that England was 
delaying peace negotiations, and ordered Malmesbury to hand in a 
formal note demanding an explanation. The instructions in both of 
these cases revealed a temper and an attitude little likely to be of aid 
in procuring peace. Pitt also wrote to Malmesbury in regard to the 
Portuguese treaty in much the same sense as had Grenville, but in 
gentler language.f He made no mention, however, of the Directory’s 
declaration. Malmesbury ventured to disobey his instructions, in that 
he did not present a formal note of complaint, but merely talked over 
with the French negotiators the declaration in question. X He was also 
greatly vexed at the stand taken by England in regard to the Portu¬ 
guese treaty, thinking that the consideration of it might well have been 
delayed in the interests of the conference at Eille. On August 29 he 
wrote to Canning, “ I consider the Portuguese peace, from the manner 
in which it has been taken up, as an event very likely to break off the 
Negotiation, ”§ and Canning himself was of the same opinion. || 
Malmesbury in fact could no longer remain blind to the change 
taking place in the temper of the English government and wrote again 
to Canning on the same day : 
“You must have perceived that the instructions and opinions I get 
from the Minister under whose orders lam bound to act , accord so little 
with the sentiments and intentions I heard expressed by the Minister 
with whom I zvish to act , that I am placed in a very disagreeable 
dilemma. If I do not conform to my instructions, I am guilty of 
diplomatic mutiny ; if I do strictly and up to the letter of them, I am 
guilty of what is worse, by lending myself to promote a measure I 
think essentially wrong. ’ ’ 1i 
He then states that he is of course perfectly ready to resign his own 
opinion as to the best method of securing peace, and declares : 
‘ ‘ But if another opinion has been allowed to prevail—if the real 
end is to differ from the ostensible one—and if I am only to remain here, 
in order to break off the Negotiation creditably , and not to terminate it suc¬ 
cessfully , I then, instead of resigning my opinion, must resign my 
*Aug. 19, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 489. 
t Aug. 19, 1797. Ibid., 491. 
t Malmesbury to Grenville and to Canning, Aug. 22, 1797. Ibid., 494, 497. 
§ Ibid., 512. 
II Ibid., 516. 
If The language of Grenville’s despatches had, in fact, convinced the French 
A Directory that England did not desire peace. Barras, II, 520. 
